



AFGHANISTAN REPORT

NO. 27

JUNE 1986

CRISIS & CONFLICT ANALYSIS TEAM
THE INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES
8, KHYABAN-E-IOBAL F/6/3,
ISLAMABAD-PAKISTAN

CRISIS AND CONFLICT ANALYSIS TEAM (CCAT)
AFGHANISTAN

AFGHANISTAN REPORT:
JUNE 1986

Chairman . . . Noor A. Husain

Project Coordinators . . . Ijaz S. Gilani
Raja Ehsan Aziz
Ali Tauqeer Sheikh

Associates . . . Najam Abbas
Naseem Rizvi

1. The Crisis and Conflict Analysis Team comprises of leading academicians, strategists, researchers and policy analysts interested in the study of international relations. The members of this team meet periodically in groups; one team is devoted to the study of the Afghan crisis and conflict. In the light of carefully monitored information each group reviews current developments in its respective conflict area, and offers various policy options for consideration. While the Institute of Strategic Studies provides the forum, coordinates research and publishes the findings of the Crisis and Conflict Analysis Team, it does not necessarily share the views expressed by the team members whose participation in this group is in their individual capacity.

2. The information and overt intelligence incorporated in this report after collection, collation, and evaluation is based on primary and secondary sources of all the parties in the conflict. The primary sources availed are the monitoring reports of Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation covering Moscow, Tashkent, Dushambe and Kabul broadcasts, Afghan, Soviet, and other Embassy handouts, and information received from the Afghan Documentation Centre, Afghan Information Centre, the Afghan Islamic Press, and the Agency Afghan Press files. Secondary sources are the international media, and research papers and writings of the academicians. We are aware of the paucity of correct, complete and timely information from closed societies, as also the lack of formal and trained command, control, communication and intelligence set-up in the Mujahideen, as present in regular armies.

— Editor

RAJA EHSAN AZIZ
ALI T. SHEIKH

Edited and Published by Noor A. Husain on behalf of the Institute of Strategic Studies vide DM. Islamabad Memo No. 2617/C of 14-7-1985 and despatched under GPO's Registered No. N-1072, Telephones: 824628, 821340, 824658.
Subscription Rates: *Annual* Rs. 120.00 *Single copy* Rs. 10; *Overseas Annual* US \$ 60.00; *Single* US \$ 5.00 including air mail. *Address:* The Institute of Strategic Studies, 8 Khyaban-e-Iqbal, F-6/3, Islamabad.
Printed by Abdal Ghani Barq at Ferozsons Rawalpindi Ltd., 32 Saddar Road Rawalpindi, Telephones: 62302 — 62366 — 67901 Telex: 54055 BARQ Pk.

ACRONYMS

AAP	=	Agency Afghan Press (Mujahideen).
AAPSO	=	Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization.
ADBA	=	Agricultural Development Bank of Afghanistan.
APC	=	Armoured Personnel Carrier.
AWMMR	=	Association of Wives and Mothers of Martyrs of Revolution.
CC	=	Central Committee.
CP	=	Communist Party.
DRA	=	Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.
DYOA	=	Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan (Karmal's).
HIS	=	Haqiqat-e-Inqilab-e-Saur ('The Truth of the Saur Revolution'), daily newspaper (Karmal's).
HMV	=	Heavy Military Vehicles.
IHT	=	International Herald Tribune.
IRC	=	International Red Cross.
KHAD	=	State Secret Service (Karmal's)
KNT	=	Kabul New Times.
LOSPA	=	Local Organs of State Power and Administration (Karmal's).
NFF	=	National Fatherland Front (Karmal's).
NVDP	=	Ningarhar Valley Development Project.
PDPA	=	Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (Karmal's).
POA	=	Pioneer Organization of Afghanistan (Karmal's).
PSFO	=	Peace, Solidarity and Friendship Organization (Karmal's).
RC	=	Revolutionary Council (Karmal's).
SAFS	=	Soviet Afghan Friendship Society.
TUA	=	Trade Unions of Afghanistan (Karmal's).
UJA	=	Union of Journalists of Afghanistan (Karmal's).
UNESCO	=	United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization.
UNGA	=	United Nations General Assembly.
VFA	=	Voice of Free Afghanistan.
VOA	=	Voice of America.
VOG	=	Voice of Germany.
VOIR	=	Voice of Islamic Revolutionary Afghanistan reportedly based in Iran.
WDOA	=	Women's Democratic Organization of Afghanistan (Karmal's).
WDS	=	Western Diplomatic Sources.
WHO	=	World Health Organization.
YPO	=	Young Pioneer's Organization (Karmal's).
'Jehad'	=	To strive, struggle, resist, fight against, as an article of Faith. One of the main tenets of Islam.
'Mujahideen'	=	Those who take part in Jihad against oppression and aggression, as an article of faith.
'Jirga'	=	Assembly of Tribal Elders.
'Loi Jirga'	=	National Assembly of Tribal Elders.
'Afghanis'	=	Afghan Currency. (US\$ 1 =130 Afghanis un-official; 50.6 official)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
The Historical Perspective .. ISSI Map	
I. The Fourth Afghan War .. <i>Raja Ehsan Aziz</i>	
Assisted by .. <i>Najam Abbas</i>	
1. Summary Perspective	1
2. Major Military Engagements	2
3. Provincewise Survey Analysis	3
4. Psychological Warfare Themes	27
APPENDICES	
1. Estimate of Losses: Mujahideen Sources	28
2. Estimate of Losses: Soviet-Kabul Sources	29
3. Provincewise Distribution of Incidents: Mujahideen Sources	30
4. Military Operations Against Mobile and Immobile Target: Mujahideen Sources	31
5. Provincewise Security Operations and Returnees — Radio Kabul Source	32
6. Maps of Afghanistan and the Region	33
II. The Politico-Economic and Cultural Development in Afghanistan .. <i>Ali Tauqeer Sheikh</i>	
Assisted by .. <i>Naseem Rizvi</i>	
1. Foreign Visits and Agreements	35
2. Political Developments	37
3. Economy	39
4. Youth and Education	40
5. Nationalities Policy	42
III. The Soviet Campaign of 1985—A Net Assessment	44

Derveshan May 20. Mujahideen groups jointly launched a series of attacks on Soviet-Kabul positions in Ainak area of Nawa district May 27. Ensuing clashes continuing for over 8 days resulted in destruction of 30 tanks/APCs/MVs, 70 Soviet-Kabul troops killed and 100 wounded and 14 Mujahideen killed and 37 wounded respectively. Mujahideen killed 3 Kabul officials in a handgrenade attack in Lashkargah city and also captured 2 Khad agents near the city May 28. Mujahideen lost 95 men and destroyed 3 newly established Soviet-Kabul posts after fighting at Bolan, Kalash and Nawa June 3 to 10. Mujahideen killed 40 and captured 100 Soviet-Kabul troops, destroyed 5 tanks and lost 11 men during operations in southern Hilmand June 4 to 17.

Radio Tehran: Mujahideen killed 70 and wounded over 100 men and destroyed 3 tanks and several APCs of "Joint Communist Army" and lost 17 men during attack on Communist Army bases in Nawak and Ahmar areas beginning June 7 (June 17).^{*} Mujahideen destroyed 5 Soviet tanks during another attack on Soviet-Kabul positions (June 23).

Qandahar

Mujahideen sources: Soviet AC/HLs bombarded village Deh Kabat in Panjwai district May 15. Mujahideen rocket attack on Qandahar provincial HQ led to Soviet-Kabul retaliatory shelling of Jada-e-Eidgah area May 15. Mujahideen rocket fire struck official building and a security post in Qandahar city May 22. Soviet-Kabul forces attacked Mujahideen in Mahi area of Qandahar city May 23. Mujahideen rocketted Soviet-Kabul convoy from Kabul near Qandahar city and destroyed 7 tanks and 11 MVs May 23, followed by retaliatory HL bombing on Mujahideen positions. Mujahideen launched missile attack on Qandahar cantonment and struck Soviet-Kabul post in Nauroz Shah Burj area May 24. Mujahideen struck Soviet-Kabul positions in Maiwand, destroyed 17 tanks/APCs and lost 23 men May 28. Soviet-Kabul aircraft bombed 10 Mujahideen jeeps carrying munition in Shahr-e-Safa area May 29. Mujahideen rocket fire struck Soviet-Kabul column in Nazar Jan suburb of Qandahar and destroyed 4 tanks May 29. Mujahideen eliminated Soviet-Kabul post set up between Maiwand and Panjwai late May. Soviets undertook a series of brutal operations and established a number of posts in Dara-e-Noor sub-district since early June. However, 500 newly arrived Mujahideen started harassing these new posts, captured 3 posts, killed 30 and captured 15 militiamen and seized their light/heavy weapons. Mujahideen shot down 1 Soviet AC near Arghandab June 3. Mujahideen repulsed Soviet-Kabul attack in Shikarpur area of Qandahar city, inflicting over 100 casualties and forcing the invading

^{*}The dates given in parenthesis are the actual broadcasts.

columns to retreat towards Olkan, Mahi Gher and Munarah desert June 3. Mujahideen thereafter encircled the retreating forces and heavy fighting was continuing in the region. Soviet-Kabul raid at Shakialai in Dara-e-Noor led to hand-to-hand fight involving 3 Russians, 5 militia and 4 Mujahideen losses, followed by Soviet-Kabul retaliatory bombing June 6. 8 Kabul troops surrendered with their weapons in Mahalajat June 6. Mujahideen shot down 1 MiG at 8.00 a.m. June 7 and another at 7.30 a.m. June 8 during Soviet-Kabul bombardment of Mujahideen positions in Malajat area of Qandahar city. Mujahideen mined Soviet-Kabul reinforcements comprising tanks and heavy guns to Qandahar near Askar Kot June 7, forcing the convoy to retreat to Kabul after 2 hours resistance. Another convoy of APCs was likewise struck and forced to retreat. Mujahideen operations led to intensified Soviet-Kabul bombing on adjoining villages. Mujahideen groups jointly attacked Soviet-Kabul positions at Qalacha and the Teachers Training Centre and destroyed 8 posts June 10. Mujahideen rocket attack set ablaze Qandahar Governorate. In another operation near Provincial Finance Office in Qandahar city, Mujahideen killed 10 and wounded 8 Parchamites. Mujahideen shot down 2 Soviet MiGs at Mir Zakai near Qandahar June 18. Mujahideen killed 8 Soviet-Kabul troops on board their jeep by throwing handgrenades near Spinbuldak June 20. Soviet-Kabul forces were sending reinforcements from Kabul and Ghazni to Qandahar and constructing bunkers at Daman in the vicinity of Qandahar to defend/secure Qandahar garrison. Soviet-Kabul air-cum-ground attack on Shin Nari valley of Arghistan, connecting Qandahar with northern regions, led to fierce fighting involving loss of 10 MVs and 2 HLs June 15 to 25. 300 Mujahideen foiled Soviet-Kabul siege in Kadani area and destroyed 60 tanks/APCs/MVs June 25.

Radio Tehran: Mujahideen attacked Soviet-Kabul military base near Qandahar (June 3). Mujahideen killed 10 Soviet-Kabul troops and destroyed 5 Soviet tanks, 6 APCs and an arms depot in the province (June 4). Mujahideen rocketted Soviet-Kabul positions and ambushed a military convoy (June 17). Mujahideen inflicted 31 casualties and destroyed 6 tanks during an ambush and attack on a military base in the vicinity of Qandahar (June 15). Mujahideen killed/captured several Soviet-Kabul troops and seized a huge quantity of arms during attack on a military post in Qandahar; in similar attack on another post near Qandahar 65 Soviet-Kabul troops were killed and 25 wounded and 3 APCs destroyed (June 17). Mujahideen shot down 1 AC in Nurbaki area while bombing their positions (June 22). Mujahideen killed 40 and captured 100 Soviet-Kabul troops and lost 11 men during fierce fighting in the province (June 23).

VOA: A wounded civilian from Qandahar said Mujahideen ("Guerillas") in southern suburbs of Mahalajat destroyed a Soviet tank and killed 12 soldiers May 28 provoking swift attacks by AC/HLs in which no Mujahideen but some 30 civilians including children were killed; hospitalized survivors in Quetta said tanks now guarded each of the security outposts in the new mined-field belt around southeastern Qandahar (June 1). Citing Western diplomats in Pakistan, Kabul's Deputy Security Minister named Nabi and several other Kabul officials were killed when their jeep struck a land-mine near Qandahar two weeks back (June 3). Citing Mujahideen Commander Abdul Razzaq's letter from Qandahar: Soviet forces had made it very difficult for people of Qandahar city to supply food and medicines to Mujahideen fighting in the area; a big Soviet force backed by tanks besieged Qandahar city May 20 after shifting from Arghandab Valley; at that time various Mujahideen groups did not make their presence in and around the city public and meanwhile Soviets established at least 6 posts on key routes of the city and Afghan militia was deployed; Soviets also extended siege of the city from 10 to 20 km; Mujahideen groups launched attacks May 22 to break the siege and killed/wounded 172 soldiers and destroyed 11 APCs and 3 tanks till May 29; Mujahideen casualties were negligible, though he did not have any details due to lack of coordination and far-flung Mujahideen strongholds (June 4). Meanwhile, a wounded Mujahid in a Quetta hospital said that they destroyed an APC in Qandahar city with rocket fire killing 12 Soviet troops aboard May 27; heavy Soviet retaliatory bombing in the area killed at least 30 civilians including women and children (June 4).

Radio Kabul: Secretary PDPA CC and Incharge Armed Forces Political Affairs Major General Yasin Sadequi inspected military units of Qandahar province recently and reviewed their military and political education and training and living conditions; Sadequi alongwith Commander Qandahar Army Corps issued necessary instructions for further improvements (June 6). A large number of "saboteurs" including their ring leaders were wiped out and 40 Chinese Klashnikovs, 10 missiles and a number of light arms were seized during operations in Qandahar outskirts; Pakistan had deployed its military personnel and militia with heavy weapons in border areas for the assistance of counter-revolutionaries and to boost up their morale, but they could not offer any resistance to the "brave" Afghan Armed Forces (June 28).

Radio Moscow: Citing Soviet journalist Viladimir Bichov on his visit to Qandahar:

"There was peace and calm in the vicinity of Qandahar Airport early morning. But silence is often deceitful in Afghanistan. Shell-

ing by the dacoits and explosions of grenades, bombs or mines can break this silence any moment. Thus Qandahar is a province where peace is too frequently disturbed. The dacoits were creating panic in the province three or four years ago. At that time they were very powerful. Now major counter-revolutionary bands have been wiped out. But enemies' interference in the province has not yet ceased and it is not surprising because Pakistan is very near to the province and thousands of dacoits are being sent from there through mountainous paths. Foreign instructors train them before sending them to Afghanistan. They are equipped with western arms".

"Secretary Provincial PDPA Saeed Qadri Kar said in fact the imperialist forces launched undeclared war against our People's Republic soonafter the April Revolution. In the beginning, enemies were not well trained and armed. With the passage of time they were trained and equipped with better arms. The bandits were receiving foreign aid. The enemy bands started ambushing and carrying out subversion in the broad day light. Imperialist media reported that counter-revolutionaries had occupied Qandahar city, but this was totally wrong."

"How the counter-revolutionaries have changed their strategy? They are creating disturbance in economic life. They are ambushing in the night and setting on fire the vehicles carrying essential goods for the people. They are laying mines in bazars, shops and mosques. Enemy bands have destroyed about half of the schools in the province. Numerous teachers have been killed. But in spite of this initiatives are in the hands of People's Government."

"The Commander Southern Areas, Major General Muhammad Hakim said that Soviet aid is highly valued in Afghanistan. He said that the presence of limited Soviet contingent in Afghanistan guarantees the independence of Afghanistan and imperialist conspiracies against our country will be ultimately foiled" (Urdu Commentary: June 15).

Jirga of Southern Tribes adopted a message to support local popular government and facilitate a stop to the bloodshed on their territory (June 28).

Zabul

Mujahideen sources: Soviet-Kabul bombardment struck Mujahideen at Deh Chupan May 13. Mujahideen attacked Soviet-Kabul forces in Spana and Charguli areas May 14. Mujahideen rocket attack on Soviet-Kabul convoy at Safa sub-district HQ led to several hours of

fierce fighting May 27. Mujahideen rocket fire and shelling on Qalat Ghilzai Army Centre blasted its ammunition depot and killed 30 Soviet-Kabul troops May 29.

VOA: Heavy bombardment followed by commando landing in 4 Helicopters and Soviet-led ground attack on Mujahideen base at Dara Shila, 40 km east of Kalat, led to 24 hours of fighting May 20 in which Mujahideen destroyed several tanks, shot down 1 Helicopter and killed 16 Soviet troops; meanwhile, Soviet-led assault force destroyed three of the Mujahideen 82mm mortar units (June 1).

Ghazni

Mujahideen sources: Mujahideen destroyed 2 Soviet-Kabul posts in Noman area of Jaghori district and inflicted heavy losses May 5 and 6. Mujahideen positions in Loman were subjected to retaliatory Soviet-Kabul bombardment May 12. Mujahideen killed 2 Kabul officers and 5 troops in a joint operation May 15. Mujahideen attack on Soviet-Kabul force in Lashmak area May 15 led to retaliatory bombing on civilians May 16. Mujahideen destroyed 5 Soviet-Kabul tanks and occupied an observation post at Loman in Jaghori on May 15-16 night. Clash near village Lashmak-e-Bakawul resulted in losses on both sides May 15. Mujahideen ambushed a military convoy at Cici on Kabul-Qandahar highway and seized 1 MV, electric generator and heavy military supplies. Mujahideen forced Soviet-Kabul convoy to retreat after mining 4 tanks at Askerkoot along Kabul-Qandahar highway June 4. Mujahideen set ablaze 2 APCs in Zerdalu region, followed by retaliatory bombardment on civilians June 5.

VOIR: 400 Kabul militia and 200 troops defected alongwith their arms and ammunition following Mujahideen declaration of general amnesty; Mujahideen captured a military post in Khawaja Amir area and killed several Soviet-Kabul activists (June 2). Mujahideen mined/ ambushed 3 military convoys in the province, followed by heavy Soviet-Kabul retaliatory bombing on civilians in Gardari area (June 23). Mujahideen were in full control of a part of the province, where enemy Aircraft/Helicopters were unable to overfly the area (June 29).

Radio Tehran: A group of Mujahideen entered Ghazni city and struck Soviet-Kabul positions, killing 70 Kabul troops and destroying 8 tanks/APCs May 15.

Paktika

Mujahideen sources: Mujahideen struck Soviet-Kabul convoy moving from Urgoon to Katawaz at Ghaib Khel May 31. Mujahideen attacked freshly despatched Kabul army division and several accom-

panying Soviet battalions to reinforce Urgoon and Gomal garrisons in Sharna with rocket fire and inflicted sizeable losses May 29 to June 1. Mujahideen counter-attack on Soviet-Kabul force reaching Urgoon June 2 and which had struck various Mujahideen positions led to the surrender of 15 Kabul militiamen/troops and 1 Soviet soldier together with 3 tanks, as the force was retreating June 11. Mujahideen repulsed Soviet-Kabul attack on Commander Arsalan's base at Khargosh in Urgoon, inflicted 35 Soviet-Kabul casualties, captured 15 troops and seized two radio communication sets and 80 light weapons June 17. Soviet aircraft struck 8 ammunition-laden Mujahideen vehicles proceeding to their bases in Ghazni at Sarooza town. Faced with stiff Mujahideen resistance, Soviet-Kabul forces at Shehr-e-Nau provincial Headquarter suspended plans to operate in Gomal and Urgoon areas and returned to Ghazni.

Paktiya

Mujahideen sources: A large Soviet-Kabul force which had attacked Zazi area May 10 and established 3 posts in Ahmad Khel, Kharchatal and Khana Paktiya, was struck by Mujahideen while returning to Gardez; Mujahideen destroyed 12 of its tanks, captured 30 Soviet-Kabul troops and seized 2 supplies-laden trucks. Mujahideen encountered Soviet-Kabul forces in Zazi area and inflicted 40 casualties May 17. Mujahideen repulsed Soviet-Kabul attack on Al-Fatah front at Spin Sheiga May 27, coinciding with Ramadan (month of fasting) and Eid-ul-Fitr (main Islamic festival), and undertook counter-attack in Sikan-dar Khel area May 27. During the operation, Mujahideen heavily shelled Soviet-Kabul security post with captured Soviet BM-12 guns and killed/ wounded 50 Soviet troops manning the post. Soviet-Kabul troops finally returned to Gardez from Nari May 29 after fierce fighting in Zazi sector. Meanwhile, Mujahideen recaptured a Soviet-Kabul post in the vicinity of Zazi May 28. Mujahideen launched a series of 107mm rocket attacks on Soviet-Kabul positions in Gardez city for 5 days early June, killing 6 Russian and 12 Kabul troops, wounding 11 Russian and 17 Kabul troops and completely destroying local Russian residential quarters. Mujahideen repeatedly struck Soviet-Kabul Nari garrison from June 6 to 9 and inflicted heavy losses June 6 to 9. Mujahideen also struck Soviet-Kabul positions near Zazi, killed 4 Soviet-Kabul officers and 11 troops including a high-ranking Soviet-Kabul officer and destroyed 2 tanks and 2 munition-laden MVs. Mujahideen struck Soviet-Kabul posts at Khartachal and Khana in Zazi, forced 30 Kabul troops to surrender and lost 7 men during the operation June 8. A fresh consignment of Soviet and Kabul troops from Khost had been deployed in

Bori Khel area and was likely to advance towards Bari in order to attempt regaining Soviet-Kabul posts lost the Mujahideen 3 years back. The consignment, however, was facing stiff Mujahideen resistance.

VOIR: Mujahideen destroyed a military post of the Communist regime in Sikander Khel area (June 2). Mujahideen killed one Soviet commander and wounded another in an operation earlier this month in Teri Mangal (June 6). Mujahideen attack on a military base of occupation forces last week led to retaliatory Soviet bombing on civilians (June 8). Fighting continued in different areas of the province and the Muslim Fighters, in view of weakening enemy morale, launched well-planned attacks on several security and military posts, causing heavy losses to the "infidal" troops (June 12). Paktiya was the main centre of combat last week, where fighting was still continuing at Zazi and Soviet-Kabul troops suffered heavy losses (June 13). Mujahideen recently foiled fierce Soviet-Kabul attack in the province, killed a number of government (of Kabul) troops and made a large number of them captives (June 13). Mujahideen also attacked Soviet-Kabul post at Ahmad Khel and caused heavy losses (June 18). Soviet-Kabul troops attacked civilians population and inflicted heavy losses in Jawara area (June 20).

Radio Tehran: Citing *Daily Jang* of Pakistan, fighting was still continuing in Paktiya (June 14). Mujahideen shot down 1 aircraft and inflicted losses to Soviet-Kabul forces on the ground in Paktiya (June 20).

BBC: Dominique Veros, a French freelance photographer who had been into Afghanistan 11 times and had just returned from Paktiya, gave his account to BBC in Islamabad of how Soviet forces appeared to be effectively monitoring and destroying guerrilla supply routes: he joined a caravan of 30 guerrillas and 100 animals (munition-laden) a week back on about 2 days journey from Pakistan border; arriving at a deserted mountain village, 30 km west of Khost, the chief town of Paktiya province the guerrillas unloaded their 10 tons of arms and ammunition in the middle of the main street where it was to be picked up by trucks; 15 minutes later 2 Soviet SU-25 jets appeared, passed over the village four times and then hit the caravan in their first attempt; the arms dump which included Klashnikovs, mortar ammunition and rockets continued to explode in all directions for several hours, while Veros took cover about 100 metres away; 1 man and 10 animals were killed and the entire village was reduced to ashes; on his return to Pakistan, Veros passed a much larger guerrilla convoy consisting of a number of different groups with 1500 packed animals loaded with equipment heading in the same direction; he thought this convoy

could also be in danger; he was impressed by the speed with which the jets had attacked and thought they must have been tipped-off possibly by Soviet commandos deployed in the mountains; his story, according to BBC, was further evidence that Soviet forces were concentrating on trying to close down guerrilla routes into Afghanistan (June 25).

VOA: Western diplomats said as many as 80 Kabul troops were killed last week in battles with Afghan rebels in Paktiya (June 3). Citing WDS, government forces suffered heavy losses in fierce fighting in Paktiya; an Afghan source was quoted to have said in Kabul that he saw 70 to 80 wounded soldiers carried to Kabul hospital from the war front in Paktiya; Afghan Islamic Press reported that fighting continuing for last one week in Zazi area had caused death of at least 60 Mujahideen and more than 60 wounded (June 4). Stiff resistance foiled Afghan army's attempts to block one of the main supply routes in Eastern Afghanistan, in which at least 80 Afghan soldiers were killed by Mujahideen-planted mines June 13; Mujahideen using mortars and rockets forced Afghan army withdrawal from newly established hill-side post June 6 night (June 8). Western Afghanistan close to Pakistan border was witnessing heavy fighting for the last 5 weeks; at least 8 Afghan militiamen got killed when ordered to clear land-mines around a military post near Bayan Khel, situated 15 km off Pakistan border along Mujahideen supply routes in Paktiya; citing Afghan Islamic Press, Mujahideen forced government troops to retreat from a newly built post at the foot of a mountain using mortar and artillery shelling and 107mm rockets June 8; the post was built to control supply to Mujahideen based in Logar, Kabul and northern provinces; Afghan troops immediately built a temporary post but Mujahideen destroyed it as well by planting mines all around; besides, Mujahideen also fired long range rockets as a result of which 36th Division HQ based in Ali Khel caught fire; 11 government troops were killed and 2 tanks destroyed in the attack and flames from the garrison could be seen at a distance of 7 miles; (the abortive) operation to capture high hills near Bayan Khel was launched by Afghan forces second week of May; although Afghan army had set up some small posts near Bayan Khel, it could not succeed in capturing Mujahideen position situated on high hills; major Mujahideen groups were participating in the fighting (June 10).

Ningarhar

Mujahideen sources: Mujahideen had besieged Soviet-Kabul regiment in Agam sub-district since May 9 and their shelling had resulted in a number of casualties. During the Zazi offensive (Paktiya), Soviet

forces reaching Hissarak-e-Ghiljayee district via Khugiani and Saroobi May 10 split into two parts at Sarchinar of Saroobi, one leaving for Hissarak and the other commencing operations in Lewani Baba towards Tizin (Kabul); Ab-e-Zangani and Azra valley came under heavy Soviet-Kabul bombing and shelling and then Soviet-Kabul forces attacked Shinki of Jigdalak, Jokan, Khanjar and other villages in Hissarak district; Russian troops set ablaze houses and destroyed altogether more than 200 houses and all the (water) mills in the valley and took away valuables from the houses, while resistance routes in the area were subjected to heavy bombardment (in order to deny Mujahideen help to the civilians). Mujahideen rocketing of Jalalabad airport from Hadda and Kan hills May 10 night and Soviet retaliatory bombing on their positions resulted in 30 Soviet-Kabul troops/officers killed and 80 wounded and damaging of 2 tanks and 1 aircraft. Mujahideen attacked a Soviet post guarding the air defence unit in Saroobi 3.00 a.m. to 5.00 a.m., destroyed 2 tanks, killed 8 Russian officers and wounded several and damaged their arms depot May 14; at 8.00 a.m. all shopkeepers of Saroobi bazar were called by Soviet-Kabul authorities to the said post and told that their children would be held as hostages until they prevailed upon Mujahideen to stop rocket firing on the post. An armed group of Russians came under Mujahideen fire in Tangi area between Torkham and Daka, eliminating 1 Russian tank alongwith its crew May 15. Meanwhile, a Russian tank hit a civilian transport vehicle at Torkham border, reportedly killing 3 passengers and driver; in retaliation, people of Torkham stoned the tanks and raised anti-Soviet and anti-Kabul slogans. Mujahideen had besieged an important Soviet-Kabul post in Azam district since May 26, Soviet-Kabul Helicopters were unable to land at the post and heavy fire by the Mujahideen had resulted in several Soviet-Kabul casualties. Mujahideen mining around Trili post in Chapparhar destroyed 1 Soviet-Kabul tank and 1 APC May 29-30. Mujahideen rocket fire on Jalalabad highway destroyed 1 tank of 606 Regiment near Torkham May 30. Mujahideen struck 6 tanks and 2 tanks carrying Soviet-Kabul militiamen of Torkham to their houses at Tangi June 5, the tanks/APCs were set ablaze, the militiamen either fled from the scene or perished and Mujahideen seized a number of weapons left behind. Jalalabad-Torkham highway often came under Mujahideen control, who then searched vehicles and supervised traffic. Soviet-Kabul men killed 3 civilians in Ambar Khani area June 5. Soviet-Kabul forces encircled Shpolay area in Rudad district and killed 8 civilians June 8. Mujahideen preemptive rocket and mortar fire on Kabul militia positions at village Shagay frustrated militia plans to ambush them June 10. Mujahideen struck Jalalabad air base June 11 and 14, which damaged 2

aircraft and destroyed 2 tanks and killed dozens of Soviet and Kabul troops. In the wake of intensified operations in Jalalabad sector, Mujahideen destroyed 3 electric pylons at Darunta June 12 which disrupted power supply in part of the city. Mujahideen also attacked Kabul posts at Behsud June 12 and 13 and inflicted sizeable losses. 25 armed militiamen defected in Achin district. Mujahideen destroyed militia posts at Adam Khel, Bazi Khel and Shamshapur in Surkhrud districts June 14. Mujahideen struck Soviet-Kabul/military convoy approaching Torkham June 19. Soviet-Kabul forces undertook house-to-house searches and forcible conscription upon encircling Chaknur, Shahikot and Khwaindu areas June 18 and left the area after setting up new posts. Soviet-Kabul tank crushed a bus carrying 17 passengers at Daka, killing 9 women and children and injuring the rest (June 18). Mujahideen killed/wounded 20 Kabul men in an operation at Sarkhakan on Jalalabad-Torkham highway June 20. Mujahideen-planted mine struck Soviet-Kabul column at Surkhrud district HQ June 22. Mujahideen shot down 1 Soviet MiG near village Rina out of three aircraft bombing Mujahideen positions at Shalman, Kama Daka and Momandara near Pakistan border June 25. Mujahideen attacked several militia posts near Hadda Farm Canal June 28. Mujahideen captured Nazian district centre and killed many militiamen in the operation June 28. Heavy Soviet-Kabul retaliatory bombardment on Mujahideen positions in Nazian and Achin districts set ablaze trees around. Mujahideen raided 3 Soviet-Kabul posts at Pekhaya ravine and another at Tanda China June 28. Mujahideen attacked and killed 8 Khad agents moving to Nazian June 29. Mujahideen also struck 71st Regiment of Ghanikhel in Shinwar, following which 50 Soviet-Kabul tanks/APCs together with Russian troops rushed to the Regiment June 28. Mujahideen groups jointly attacked Achin district HQ in Shinwar June 27. In latest Soviet-Kabul conscription drive under the new decree, while teachers, students and regime employees of Ningarhar were being sent to 81st Regiment, Soviet-Kabul troops opened fire on a group of conscriptions and shot dead two young men trying to jump out of their vehicle in Surkh Dewal area. Jalalabad bazars, streets and villages had a deserted look following promulgation of the new decree. The decree had led to deepening of Khalq-Parcham differences and was likely to force many people to flee as refugees. Meanwhile restrictions had reportedly been imposed on transportation of consumer goods between Kabul and Jalalabad.

Radio Kabul: 70 families influenced by venomous counter-revolutionary propaganda returned to Khugiani district, availing general amnesty, and resumed peaceful life (June 26).

Kunar

Mujahideen sources: Mujahideen attacked Soviet-Kabul supporters in villages Tanar and Arazai in Khas Kunar district and eliminated Tanar post June 4. Mujahideen groups jointly launched rocket attack on Mart Qala post June 5. Mujahideen mortar fire struck Sarkani district HQ causing militia losses June 10. Mujahideen rocketted Soviet-Kabul artillery regiment and battalion at Yar Gul and Salarbagh. Mujahideen frustrated major Soviet-Kabul offensive on their base in Dangam area June 17.

Provinces Bordering Soviet Union

Badakhshan (also bordering Pakistan)

Mujahideen sources: Mujahideen attacked an important army post in Darwaz sub-district, killed 20 Soviet-Kabul troops and lost 7 men and seized 5 machine guns late May. Mujahideen attacked a small Soviet-Kabul airport at Koran Va Majan, inflicted 30 casualties and lost 9 men. Mujahideen had lost control of the airport, meant to receive Soviet-Kabul supplies from Kabul, some 3 years back. Mujahideen struck 2 Soviet-Kabul posts in Warsaj valley, close to Pamir mountain range, where Soviet-Kabul supply lines were presently under constant Mujahideen attacks. Mujahideen killed 8 Russians and 25 Parchamites and wounded hundreds of Soviet-Kabul men during attacks on their positions in Kishm district June 1. Mujahideen mortar fire on a military camp in Kishm led to 20 Soviet-Kabul and 2 Mujahideen losses June 5. Mujahideen rocket fire struck Soviet troops crossing the Amu in a motor boat from their Qila Khulm garrison in Darwaz area June 14. The Soviet force on board several boats was trying to launch cross-Amu offensive on Mujahideen base at Warlaj, on the Afghan side of Darwaz region.

VOIR: In a well-planned attack, Mujahideen destroyed a number of tanks and killed scores of enemy troops; retaliatory enemy bombardment in Faizabad suburbs killed a number of civilians (June 14).

Takhar

Mujahideen sources: Mujahideen attacked Democratic Youth Office in Taloqan and killed 8 Kabul officials June 5. Mujahideen mortar fire on a military post in Bangi area killed 5 Soviet-Kabul troops June 6.

Kunduz

Mujahideen sources: Mujahideen rocket fire on Soviet convoy in

Qala-e-Zal district destroyed 3 oil tankers and 1 tank May 20. Mujahideen attacked Bagh-e-Amoomi security post in Khanabad sub-district HQ May 21. A post in same area was also struck, killing 8 Soviet-Kabul troops and seized 6,000 rounds ammunition May 11.

VOIR: 23 Soviet-Kabul troops were killed and 1 tank and 3 MVs destroyed in a clash in Khanabad district (June 25).

Radio Tehran: Mujahideen attacked 2 Soviet-Kabul post including a command post in Khanabad area and inflicted several casualties (June 13).

BBC: Citing from Commander Masood's letter: he mentioned five different guerrilla operations in Baghlan and Kunduz undertaken between mid-May and mid-June; guerrillas from different groups jointly under his leadership attacked 9 government security posts in a major town and air base at Kunduz May 16; retaliatory bombing following day killed/wounded a number of civilians (June 24).

Baghlan

Mujahideen sources: A large Soviet-Kabul forces comprising more than 300 tanks/MVs, units of Mazar Div, Baghlan Artillery Regiment and Baghlan Police Force attacked Mujahideen positions in Khal Qudugh area May 14; Mujahideen foiled Soviet-Kabul encirclement after 7 days of fierce fighting; Mujahideen killed 120 and captured 28 Soviet-Kabul troops along with their arms, seized 3 Wireless sets and 16 weapons from the retreating force; Soviet-Kabul shelling and bombardment before the retreat destroyed 90 per cent of the houses, already vacated by the fleeing civilian population, and caused damage to agriculture; Mujahideen from other regions played an important role in breaking Soviet-Kabul siege.

VOIR: Mujahideen launched successful attacks on Soviet-Kabul posts in Deh Moala area of Andrab district of Baghlan, completely destroying the posts and killing a commander of the infidel enemy troops (June 21).

Radio Tehran: Mujahideen occupied 3 military posts in the province, captured about 50 Soviet-Kabul troops and seized huge quantity of arms (June 4).

BBC: Citing from Commander Masood's letter: Many more (than 70) government troops were killed with 1 tank destroyed when a Soviet-Kabul Division came under Mujahideen attack at Nehrin in Baghlan province (June 24).

Samangan

Mujahideen sources: Mujahideen attack on National Fatherland

Front base at Koh-i-Bust led to 2 days of fighting in which 12 Soviet-Kabul troops were killed and 40 captured and 45 Klashnikovs, 4 machine guns, 2 RR 82 rockets, 3 Dushkas, 7 different kinds of guns, 3 rocket launchers and 475 boxes of ammunition were seized June 1.

Balkh

Mujahideen sources: Mujahideen foiled Soviet-Kabul siege of village Qul Temor in Nehrin-e-Shahi district (of Mazar) after all night clashes in which 11 militiamen were killed and 3 surrendered May 20. Mujahideen ambushed Soviet convoy moving from Mazar to Shiberghan at Temorak, followed by heavy Soviet-Kabul retaliatory bombing on adjoining areas May 28. On June 7 Mujahideen struck Soviet-Kabul forces which had encircled Daulatabad district on June 6 night on a search-cum-forcible conscription mission, enabling many detainees to escape. Mujahideen struck 2 militia posts in the province June 14. Mujahideen forces Soviet-Kabul contingent to retreat from village Bedu in Syedabad district after 27 Soviet-Kabul officers and 70 troops got killed. 11 Soviet-Kabul troops surrendered and 12 tanks/MVs were destroyed; meanwhile, napalm bombing and rocketing by Soviet-Kabul aircraft destroyed crops in the area.

Radio Kabul: A group of 190 misled compatriots along with their ring leaders and commanders recently surrendered in Balkh and Jozjan provinces (June 9).

Jozjan

Radio Kabul: Two counter-revolutionary groups numbering 71 recently surrendered with their arms and promised to work for the promotion of April Revolution (June 13). A group of 190 misled compatriots together with their ring leaders and commanders surrendered in Sangchard district of Jozjan and Balkh (June 15).

Faryab

Mujahideen sources: A large Russian force crossed Soviet-Afghan border via Aqina port and joined Soviet-Kabul units drawn from Dehdachi and Shiberghan in Andkhoy district April 12, while Russian commandos were airlifted to the district directly from Soviet Union. These ground forces combined with wholesome airpower subjected villages and valleys of Andkhoy district to heavy shelling and bombardment. However, stiff Mujahideen resistance for 14 days resulted in hundreds of Soviet-Kabul casualties and loss of 5 tanks and 2 helicopters. The brutal offensive involving hundreds of casualties and large scale destruction was aimed at staging so-called elections for local

organs. Meanwhile, a flood of April 21 compounded distressing situation in the district due to acute food shortage. About 800-1000 people were reportedly killed and 1000s became homeless in the twin disasters of April.

BBC: Fierce 3 days fighting erupted in the province last month when guerrillas ambushed a military convoy and 120 men were killed; Radio Kabul account of fighting gave no casualty figures but said the guerrillas had been crushed (June 6).

Badghis

Radio Kabul: Security forces wiped out a number of counter-revolutionary elements including their leaders, while a number of them were arrested with arms (June 13).

Provinces Bordering Iran

Herat (also bordering Soviet Union)

Mujahideen sources: Mujahideen encountered Soviet-Kabul convoy of 200 tanks/APCs proceeding to Reeya Niqra area to wipe out their base and killed 21 Soviet-Kabul men including one Political Commissioner from 112th Brigade. Mujahideen successfully resisted attempts by Soviet and Kabul forces to seal the route to Herat with the help of tanks and artillery and inflicted 20 casualties April 23. Mujahideen destroyed 2 APCs with rocket fire and killed 20 Soviet-Kabul troops during a clash near Shindand district April 23. Some 300 Soviet-Kabul tanks, infantry units and long range artillery moved to Karta Bagh area of Herat to protect high ranking Soviet and Afghan officers and project calm during April anniversary celebrations came under Mujahideen shelling April 25. Mujahideen thrice attacked 3 different posts and inflicted heavy losses during April 27 to May 5. Mujahideen attacked Mughal Bacha and Suhar posts, killed/wounded 20 troops, captured the rest and seized 30 different kinds of rifles and large quantity of ammunition May 2. Mujahideen undertook various operations in villages Koh-e-Chasht, Badam, Tow, Kamar Zard and Dad Chubi of Karukh district, liberated the entire area, killed 30 Soviet-Kabul troops and seized 31 jeeps of a Russian convoy in Rabat-e-Sangi area May 22. Mujahideen fired 60 rockets on Shindand air base which destroyed 6/damaged several aircraft and killed 17 Russians June 3. Mujahideen destroyed or occupied more than 15 Soviet-Kabul posts, mostly in collaboration with Kabul army officers, during attack on Herat city second week of June. Mujahideen also killed 30 Soviet-Kabul men and seized large quantity of weapons during the Herat operation.

Mujahideen groups launched coordinated attack on 30 security posts around Herat city known as 'Protection Wall' June 15 morning. Most of the troops manning these posts fled away, while 40 of them were taken prisoners and handed over to the 'Court of Liberated Areas'. Mujahideen fiercely resisted Soviet-Kabul attack on their bases in Gulran and Doab areas, inflicted sizeable casualties, captured 25 Soviet-Kabul troops, destroyed 6 tanks and lot of weapons and lost 11 men June 14 to 18.

VOIR: Soviet-Kabul forces bombed civilian population in Herat province (June 8). Mujahideen eliminated Soviet-Kabul troops from 5 villages of Karosh area recently, inflicted 30 casualties, seized huge quantity of arms and lost 8 men (June 9). A number of Soviet-Kabul troops got killed and 1 Soviet tank and several MVs were destroyed during Mujahideen operation in Islam Qila recently; Mujahideen repulsed a big Soviet-Kabul offensive to occupy a village and inflicted heavy losses (June 10). A Soviet APC was blown up in mine explosion near Islam Dara (June 11). Kabul aircraft bombed civilian population of Herat last week (June 17). Mujahideen launched attack on Soviet-Kabul forces and inflicted heavy losses in the province (June 24). Mujahideen threw a bomb on Soviet-Kabul positions in Islam Qila, which killed 3 troops; the explosion caused panic to a military convoy passing nearby; Mujahideen carried out successful activities against Soviet-Kabul forces including destruction of 1 tank in Rodegaz area of Herat; this followed repeated bombing of civilians in the area (June 26). Mujahideen killed 1 Khad agent and wounded another in Herat suburbs last month; 1 Soviet tank was also destroyed in the area; 8 Soviet-Kabul troops were killed and 1 Soviet APC destroyed by mine blast when a Soviet-Kabul military convoy was proceeding to besiege Mujahideen positions near Herat city a few days back (June 28). Mujahideen repulsed attacks in Dau (Doab) and Karkare areas of Herat to capture Mujahideen positions June 22 after destroying 6 tanks and inflicted large number of casualties (June 29).

Radio Tehran: Mujahideen eliminated a number of Soviet-Kabul troops in a series of operations in Herat suburbs recently; citing Central News Unit in Islamabad, villages Koshikashk, Adam Masjid and Dama-sha were cleared of Soviet-Kabul troops after killing more than 30 of them, seizure of huge quantity of arms and loss of 5 Mujahideen (June 7). Nadr (Nasr) group of Afghan resistance movement reported that Soviet-Kabul forces were disfiguring original shape of Herat city, where many of the mosques had been destroyed and shape of several others changed; Mujahideen attacked positions of Soviet-Kabul troops in Herat city, killed/wounded 50 troops, destroyed 7 Soviet tanks and captured

huge quantity of arms (June 25). Mujahideen wiped out several Soviet-Kabul bases in the province last week, killed at least 60 Soviet-Kabul troops and seized large quantity of arms and communication equipment; Mujahideen killed 11 Soviet-Kabul men and destroyed 1 Soviet tank in village Daradar, which was earlier besieged by Soviet-Kabul army (June 22).

BBC: Mujahideen killed/wounded several dozen Kabul troops and lost 5 men in an attack on a military camp in Herat June 15 (June 20). Mujahideen attacked Soviet-Kabul security base west of Herat June 15; a large part of Herat city was under Mujahideen control, although Soviet-Kabul troops had set up posts around the city; Mujahideen captured 30 posts and seized a big quantity of weapons; Mujahideen were awaiting Soviet-Kabul counter-attack; earlier reports said Mujahideen had repulsed Soviet-Kabul attacks near Soviet-Iran border northwest of Herat; a number of APCs were destroyed and over 20 Afghan troops captured in combat; tens of Mujahideen were killed and 27 seriously wounded (June 21).

VOA: Mujahideen rocketted Shindand air base, destroyed several Soviet aircraft and killed at least 24 Soviet troops May 30 (June 8). Soviet campaign to cut off Mujahideen supply routes had expanded to southern desert area, while Mujahideen bases were being attacked since June 15; 11 persons were killed during Soviet-Kabul attacks on Mujahideen positions at Karkari and Sharsheri along Iranian border June 19; Mujahideen had destroyed 10 Afghan tanks and 2 MVs; 200 Mujahideen of three major Mujahideen groups were defending the two positions, while more guerrillas were being sent from reserved force of 2000 Mujahideen (June 21). At least 30 Mujahideen had been killed and many more wounded in fierce fighting around Governor House and Police Centre to gain complete control of Herat city June 21; most of Herat city was under Mujahideen control, who launched the attack last week; Mujahideen could not furrash Soviet-Kabul casualties, but said seven Afghan army tanks were destroyed and large quantity of weapons captured (June 22). Mujahideen claimed to have gained control of Herat city and captured an important post north of the city; only one out of 20 militia posts in Herat captured June 13 to 18 offered no resistance; Afghan soldiers manning other posts surrendered peacefully; however, 12 militiamen were killed when they tried to defend the post in Charikar, but other soldiers from the post later surrendered; Mujahideen captured hundreds of weapons during five-days operation and now they planned to attack the two remaining Soviet-Kabul positions in Herat, the Governor House and Police Centre; Mujahideen also attacked an important military post at Duab, 55 km north of Herat, on highway

to Soviet Union (June 22).

VOG: Mujahideen destroyed a Soviet transport plane in Western Afghanistan and killed 15 Russian troops on board (June 9). Mujahideen had taken control of northwestern part of Herat city; though Security Forces HQ was in government hand; more than 200 Soviet-Kabul troops had been killed in the attack launched June 15 (June 20).

Radio Kabul: Comrade Najib visited the air base and border troops of Shindand area this morning; he also paid a visit to Zaranj, the provincial HQ of Nimruz; Najib also met toiling people, Ulema, spirituals and elders and workers of Shindand and Nimruz; he was accompanied by Defence Minister Major General Nazar Mohammad and National Security Minister Brigadier General Ghulam Farooq Yaqubi (June 16).

Farah

Mujahideen sources: Mujahideen shot down 1 aircraft in Bala Baluk district killing all crew members.

VOIR: Mujahideen killed about 80 Soviet-Kabul troops and captured huge quantity of arms (June 2). Mujahideen inflicted heavy infidel casualties during attack on a military post in Anardarra area; another Mujahideen attack on Soviet-Kabul air base damaged a number of fighter aircraft (June 14).

Radio Tehran: Mujahideen fired 60 missiles on Shindand air base (June 8). Mujahideen missile attack on Shindand air base last week destroyed 2 helicopters and set ablaze the fuel depot; Kabul aircraft subjected civilian population of Herat suburbs to intensive bombardment (June 10).

VOA: Mujahideen killed 17 including 5 Soviet soldiers in an ambush May 30, 25 km northeast of Farah city, where newly formed United Front comprising 3 major Mujahideen groups encircled Soviet-Kabul contingent proceeding to Smalgrah military post near Farah city; Mujahideen also lost 3 men with 4 wounded; Soviet-Kabul contingent returned to Farah city after being badly beaten (June 14).

Radio Kabul: Large number of counter-revolutionary elements were wiped out and huge quantity of Italian and American made light arms including handgrenades and mines were seized from criminals (June 29).

Nimruz

See 'Provinces Bordering Pakistan' above.

Central Afghanistan

Bamiyan

VOIR: Fierce clash between Mujahideen and Soviet-Kabul troops near provincial HQ of Bamiyan in recent past resulted in destruction of a number of Afghan military posts and killing of 4 Soviet troops (June 4).

Ghor

VOIR: Mujahideen attacked a military convoy in Chagcharan area recently, killing/wounding 20 Soviet troops and inflicting heavy material loss (June 20).

Uruzgan

Nil report from all sources.

Kabul and Adjacent Provinces

Kabul

Mujahideen sources: 7 Russians were killed and 4 wounded in a bomb explosion at Kabul airport May 5, 3 girls and one boy were killed and 11 wounded when Soviet-Kabul forces opened fire on anti-Najib demonstrations in Kabul May 5 and 6. A pro-Najib meeting in Kabul University was disrupted by a bomb blast killing 2 and wounding 26 persons and which prompted arrest of a pro-Karmal Parchamite. Two newly appointed Revolutionary Council members Miss Ruhafza and Mr. Nasser Dehqan were reportedly killed when their car was ambushed between Qala-e-Zaman and Kabul city May 13. Mujahideen raided a Soviet post at Khaikhana, north of Kabul, killed 21 Russian troops and seized their arms and ammunition May 15. Following the incident, 9 residents of surrounding houses including two Parchamites were arrested. A series of student demonstrations in Kabul since early May were still continuing. In the aftermath of killing of 7 Parchamites in Presidential Palace on May 18, students of Bibi Mariam High School in northern Khaikhana boycotted classes and demonstrated in school ground chanting "Soviets leave Afghanistan" and "Long Live Islam" and marched out of the premises. The same day, students of Kabul University and other institutions marched to the city roads and raised full-throated slogans against Soviet occupation. The patrolling Soviet troops beat up the students with rifles/guns leaving 60 of them seriously wounded. Mujahideen repulsed Soviet-Kabul attack in Shakardara district May 16. Mujahideen foiled Soviet-Kabul air-cum-ground offen-

sive and raised seven days Soviet-Kabul siege of their bases in Teezin area May 17. Meanwhile, the Russians upon entering vacated houses poisoned food and gunned down animals; mines planted by Mujahideen blow up 2 returning tanks and 1 oil tanker. Mujahideen captured 5 Kabul troops and seized 10 rifles in Paghman area May 24. Mujahideen destroyed 1 Khad jeep with rocket fire near Jagdalak and raided a security post near village Dargoo on Kabul-Jalalabad highway May 25, followed by retaliatory air raids on Mujahideen-controlled areas and in turn Mujahideen rocket fire destroying 6 Soviet-Kabul tanks. Mujahideen attacked a Soviet post and 2 residences of Russian advisors in Shena Ganoo area off Saroobi district, killing 25 Russian troops and destroying 1 MV May 26. Mujahideen mined 1 Soviet-Kabul tank at Tapae-Buland near Kabul May 27. Mujahideen struck Saroobi district HQ with mortar and rocket fire, killed 7 Russian troops and destroyed 1 tank May 28. Soviet-Kabul forces raided Shakardara district and Mujahideen had to retreat in the wake of heavy bombardment May 30. Rumours were afloat in Kabul that Najibullah had been fired upon by Karmal supporters and received bullet injury June 2. A National Fatherland Front meeting organised by Kabul regime in Paghman turned into an anti-Soviet outburst, the stage was ransacked and regime officials fled away to escape people's wrath June 3. Najib-Karmal factionalism led to armed clash in Party's Youth HQ June 3. Mujahideen attacked two Soviet-Kabul strongholds in Paghman and after three days of fighting Soviet-Kabul positions were occupied by Mujahideen, 14 regime activists were killed and 46 pieces of arms seized May 24. On June 5, over 300 Russian vehicles launched two-pronged retaliatory offensive in Paghman and reached the district HQ June 6 after suffering heavy losses. Here, some Soviet and Kabul troops reportedly beheaded killed Mujahideen and displayed their heads. The same day, Soviet-Kabul forces operated further west in Chawki-Arghandy, Maidan, Jalrez and Sanglakh districts, but suffered heavy casualties and lost 1 helicopter and 1 aircraft. Three bomb explosions struck Wazir Akbar Khan Mina in Kabul June 8. Mujahideen rocket fire coming from the direction of Paghman in the west and Shewaki in the east hit Khairkhana, Pule Charkhi, Kabul Customs House and other locations in the capital June 9 night, prompting Soviets to shell suspected Mujahideen positions. Mujahideen rocket attack on capital Kabul the following night led to Soviet retaliatory bombardment of surrounding villages. One such village named Wutkhel, near Pule Charkhi, lost 13 houses and had 22 civilian casualties because of the bombardment. Najib-Karmal factionalism led to violent clashes in Kabul involving Soviet troops and several deaths June 15. Mujahideen rocket (107mm) fire struck Police

Academy, Polytechnic and Kabul Silo June 23, followed by retaliatory Soviet-Kabul shelling.

VOIR: 7 PDPA (Parcham faction) members were executed in Kabul May 16 for staging pro-Karmal demonstrations, while whereabouts of another 20 demonstrators were still unknown (June 1). Mujahideen ambushed a military convoy at Shakardara destroying several tanks, followed by Soviet retaliatory bombing on civilians; Mujahideen raided Soviet army positions at Balahisar in Kabul, causing heavy losses to Soviet equipment (June 8). Mujahideen shot down 1 Soviet helicopter over Kabul city; *Izvestia* confirmed that the helicopter was on patrolling flight when hit; it added that a road in Kabul city was to be named "Soviet Military Revolution"; Mujahideen struck a military post at Saroobi, killed 7 Soviet troops and set ablaze 1 tank (June 11). In continuation of their attacks on Soviet-Kabul troops, Mujahideen struck Soviet-Kabul military convoys in Shakardara, Guldara and Istalif June 7, leading to Soviet retaliatory bombing on civilian population; Mujahideen also launched rocket attacks on Kabul city (June 13). Over 2500 inhabitants of Paghman forcibly assembled to participate in public meeting arranged by Soviet-Kabul troops (on 13th Jauza) disturbed the occasion by shouting Islamic slogans and demanding withdrawal of Soviet troops; followed the disturbance, the Communists were forced to flee the scene in tanks and APCs (June 15). Soviet-Kabul attacks in Kargha and Arsalan Shaya areas caused heavy civilian losses; Mujahideen operation in Nakhsha area led to Soviet-Kabul attack on civilians; Afghans forcibly conscripted had availed the opportunity to join Mujahideen ranks alongwith their arms and ammunition (June 20). Soviet-Kabul house-to-house search for conscription in Kabul city and surrounding areas to recruit youth aged 15-18 years had aroused great fear and harassment among the people (June 25). Mujahideen shot down 1 Soviet military transport aircraft around Kabul (June 27).

Radio Tehran: Mujahideen attack on Soviet-Kabul convoy in Shakardara area destroying several Soviet tanks/APCs led to retaliatory bombing on civilian population recently (June 2). Afghan "revolutionaries" (Mujahideen) attacked a MV in Dalat city killing 3 Khad agents (June 7). A Soviet aircraft was shot down in Kabul city last week (June 24).

VOA: Citing diplomats, 36 PDPA members were killed when Mujahideen attacked party office in Paghman, 27 km northwest of Kabul, May 17 (June 3); Mujahideen holding positions on western hills, launched heavy rocket attack on western parts of Kabul June 23 night, hitting the Police Academy where 6 people were killed; Polytechnic building was considerably damaged while another 3 persons got killed

and 12 were wounded; a rocket also struck an Afghan army tank near a grain store killing 4 persons; rockets also hit Afghan militia's residential area killing 13 people; Afghan artillery fired several rockets on western hills a few minutes after the attack and 3 people were killed in the shelling; Soviet and Afghan joint force undertook a sweep operation in Paghman area and killed 7 villagers June 24; Mujahideen also shot down, apparently with a rocket, an attacking jet aircraft at Mahmunda near Pakistan border (June 27).

Radio Beijing: Guerrillas shot down 1 Soviet aircraft and 2 helicopters on June 3 and 14 in Kabul city and Logar province (June 20).

Radio Bangladesh: Soviet-Kabul government was trying to make maximum recruitment for its army so that these recruits could be deployed around Kabul by the end of this month (June 25).

Radio Kabul: A number of "saboteurs" who had subverted peaceful life of our people were wiped out during successful operations in Shakardara district and various kinds of arms were seized from the criminals (June 28).

Radio Moscow: Citing Radio Kabul, four secret counter-revolutionary bases had been eliminated near Kabul and 20 rockets and large quantity of arms and ammunition were also seized (June 15).

Parwan

Mujahideen sources: Mujahideen attacked Russian posts at Pul-i-Mattack in Jablus Siraj and in ensuing engagements for many hours 3 Russians and one post commander were killed. In another operation same day in Kotee region of Jablus Siraj 6 Soviet-Kabul got killed. Mujahideen shot down 1 MiG using anti-aircraft in Ghorbund area June 4. In a series of operations in Charikar June 1 and 3, Mujahideen killed 5 Russians and 8 Parchamites, destroyed Soviet residential complex and captured 9 light weapons. Mujahideen attacked Soviet-Kabul positions in Turkamn region killing 4 Soviet-Kabul troops, leading to retaliatory bombardment which killed 14 civilians. Mujahideen rocket fire on Charikar destroyed outer wall of Governor House and killed 5 Soviet-Kabul guards June 10. Mujahideen also stormed the local party office in Charikar same day, killed 7 Parchamites and seized heavy munition. 4 Soviet-Kabul troops were killed during clash with Mujahideen near village Tarahman June 6, followed by Soviet-Kabul shelling which killed 13 civilians.

VOIR: Mujahideen shot down 1 MiG on 14th of current month (Afghan calendar) (June 18). 20 party activists of both factions were killed by Mujahideen in Charikar (June 30).

Radio Tehran: Over 21 Soviet-Kabul troops were killed and several

wounded during Mujahideen attack on Soviet army HQ in the province May 13 (June 4).

Radio Kabul: Two counter-revolutionary groups of bandits recently surrendered in Sare Pul district, expressed repentance over their past misdeeds, pledged to defend gains of the revolution and joined the district defence groups; meanwhile, two strongholds of Gulbadin and Harkat bands were wiped out in the province and different kinds of arms and ammunition seized (June 11).

Kapisa

Mujahideen sources: Mujahideen shot down 1 Soviet attacking aircraft and struck a security post in Najrab area June 3 (also covered by VOIR on June 21).

VOIR: Large Soviet-Kabul forces had moved from Kabul to Panjsher Valley recently; meanwhile, Mujahideen were in a state of preparedness to repel impending Soviet-Kabul offensive in northern area of the valley, under their full control; Mujahideen were still holding important strategic points in the Panjsher Pass (June 24 and 27).

BBC: Citing Commander Masood's letter: Mujahideen groups launched a joint attack in Arghandab Valley, north of Panjsher, killing 70 Soviet-Kabul troops, knocking out 4 APCs and losing 11 men May 21 (June 24).

VOG: Mujahideen had begun evacuating large number of their men from Panjsher Valley (June 10).

Laghman

Mujahideen sources: Soviet and Kabul forces suffered heavy losses during various attacks on Mujahideen positions in Alishang and Alingar valleys June 15. Over 100 Soviet-Kabul troops were reportedly killed in another engagement June 24, leading to retaliatory bombardment on various villages of the province. Soviet helicopters fired rockets on a passenger bus in Kats area which killed all except 6 wounded survivors on board June 26.

Logar

Mujahideen sources: Soviet-Kabul forces blocked Mujahideen supply route at Doabandi in second week of May. Mujahideen pounded Deh Kolanger post with mortar and rocket fire May 24 night. Mujahideen attacked Soviet-Kabul posts at Deh Mughalan and Mir Abdal, destroyed 3 barracks and captured 1 mortar gun and 1 Dushka May 26. Mujahideen struck Soviet-Kabul positions in Pule Alam and Aab Chakan areas, whereas Soviet-Kabul forces had been shelling Mujahi-

deen bases in Burki Burk area from Pule Alam provincial HQ. Mujahideen ambushed a military convoy on Kabul-Gardez highway June 1. Mujahideen attacked Soviet-Kabul posts in Deh Mughalan area June 4 and a militia post at Qala June 6. Mujahideen destroyed 1 tank during clash with Soviet-Kabul forces in Kolanger area June 12. During attack on Soviet-Kabul posts at Deh Mughalan, Mujahideen shot down 2 helicopters, destroyed 5 tanks, killed 40 Soviet-Kabul troops and wounded hundreds and set ablaze large quantity of munition June 13. Mujahideen frustrated Soviet-Kabul search of village Doshandi in Kutub Khail region of Baraki Barck district, a completely liberated area for years, after inflicting heavy losses June 21. Mujahideen attacked a military convoy coming from Gardez near Mohammad Agha June 14, destroyed 2 tanks with rocket fire and shot down 1 helicopter and damaged another. Thereafter, Mujahideen shelled Soviet-Kabul post and ammunition depot in same area.

Radio Tehran: Mujahideen attacked 2 Soviet-Kabul military bases and mined an army truck in Logar (June 3). Mujahideen shot down 1 aircraft and 1 helicopter in Paktiya and Logar (June 20).

Wardak

Mujahideen sources: Joint Soviet and Afghan force reached Sayedabad district May 17 and planted anti-personnel mines in orchards, pastures and along the routes. Mujahideen established control over Sayedabad district May 19 to 21, carried out lightning attacks on Soviet-Kabul forces in Utari and Haft Asiab areas and another 4 attacks in Shashqala and Bidaka areas May 22 and 24 and also seized large quantity of military hardware. Mujahideen struck Qila Kashmir military camp, killed 6 Soviet troops and 2 officers and captured 1 Russian May 25. Soviet-Kabul forces shelled and rocketted areas surrounding Sayedabad district HQ, killing 65 civilians and Mujahideen May 27. Mujahideen struck a military camp in Wardak, west of Kabul city. Mujahideen killed 4 Soviet-Kabul troops in operations at Deh Afghanan and Ibrahim Khel May 28. The same day, Mujahideen rocketted a military convoy in Shahabuddin area. Soviet-Kabul forces attacked Mujahideen positions near provincial capital Maidan city June 1, but suffered heavy losses including 50 defections. The following day Soviet-Kabul bombardment struck Gardana, Qarachagh, Mami Khel, Turi Khel and Charaka. Soviet-Kabul forces struck Mujahideen positions of Maidan Markaz June 2, leading to 13 hours clashes and losses on both sides. Mujahideen destroyed 1 tank and killed 18 Russian troops in an operation in Tukhmak region along Kabul-Qandahar highway June 3, followed by fierce Soviet shelling (with BM-41) in Ander region which caused

extensive damage to civilian life and property and livestock. Mujahideen captured 3 Russian troops from the convoy ambushed between Utari and Shashqala, moving from Kabul to Ghazni, June 3. Mujahideen repulsed Soviet-Kabul offensive in Chak district June 5, destroying 4 tanks, 3 oil tankers and 2 MVs. 7 Parchamites were killed, 60 Kabul troops defected and a large quantity of weapons were seized during Mujahideen counter-attack June 10. Soviet-Kabul forces bombarded Kota Ashru Bazar area without provocation causing extensive damage to civilian population. Soviet-Kabul air raids for over 6 hours in Nerkh region caused civilian and Mujahideen casualties and destruction of houses, orchards and village Ghondi mosque June 21.

Radio Kabul: A large number of saboteurs were wiped out during security operations in Rahdarra area (June 13).

4 — PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE THEMES

Radio Kabul: Given below are the major Kabul media themes in June 1986 in descending order of recurrence:

1. Playing up the allegedly dictatorial, increasingly unpopular, unlawful, repressive and crisis-ridden 'Zia regime' still ruling Pakistan.
2. Undeclared war and foreign intervention in the 'Democratic Republic' of Afghanistan involving the US, Pakistan, Iran, China and some Western countries.
3. Incitement of Pakistani Tribals along Pak-Afghan border against the Government of Pakistan and Afghan refugees/Mujahideen and identifying the Tribals with the 'Saur Revolution' and 'Democratic Republic' of Afghanistan.
4. Attacks on the personality of General Zia-ul-Haq, the President of Pakistan.
5. Projecting claims of normalcy, consolidation of Kabul regime and socio-economic and political reforms in Afghanistan under the 'Saur Revolution'.

Radio Moscow: Given below are the major Moscow media themes in June 1986 in descending order of recurrence:

1. US-led undeclared war and foreign intervention in the 'Democratic Republic' of Afghanistan.
2. Kabul regime sought peaceful solution of the situation 'around' Afghanistan, while US was obstructing settlement prospects.
3. Counter-revolutionaries stood defeated and demoralized, whereas the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan could not be overthrown and escalation of the war/intervention would not

- succeed.
4. Projection of claims concerning gains of the 'Saur Revolution', local bodies elections, national reconciliation and service to Islam by the regime in Kabul.
 5. Inciting popular hatred against Afghan refugees/Mujahideen ('Counter-revolutionaries') among both Pakistanis and Afghan people.

APPENDIX — 1

ESTIMATE OF LOSSES IN JUNE 1986: MUJAHIDEEN SOURCES

Soviet Casualties: 216 killed, 151 wounded and 6 captured.

Kabul Casualties: 504 killed, 702 wounded and 193 captured.

Defections: 252 Kabul troops/militiamen.

Soviet-Kabul Casualties: Estimated 1228 killed, 678 wounded and 129 captured.

Mujahideen Casualties: 282 killed and 248 wounded.

Afghan Civilians: 1047 killed and 171 wounded.

Soviet-Kabul Material Losses: 23 aircraft; 12 helicopters; 133 tanks; 44 APCs; 49 tanks/APCs; 21 HMTVs; 44 MTVs/trucks; 21 oil tankers; 3 jeeps; approx: 700 light/heavy weapons; 1 ammunition depot; 14 large quantities munition; 475 boxes and 6,000 rounds ammunition; 9 wireless sets; 3 electric generators; 3 pylons; 1 river boat; 1 ambulance; 51 posts; 17 regime buildings; 2 Soviet residential complexes; 3 barracks.

Mujahideen and Afghan Civilian Losses: 370 houses; 23 orchards; 90 per cent of area's agricultural locality and all water mills in two valleys; 71 donkeys/horses; 25 light/heavy weapons; 1 cannon; 8 munition-laden vehicles; 10 jeeps; 1 mosque.

APPENDIX — 2

ESTIMATE OF LOSSES IN JUNE 1986: SOVIET-KABUL (RADIO KABUL) SOURCES

Mujahideen and Afghan Civilian ("Counter-revolutionaries")
Losses: 95 killed and 10 captured in 5 provinces.

Returnees (those availing amnesty, voluntarily surrendering, changing allegiance and joining Soviet-Kabul ranks): 281 returnees (voluntarily surrendering together with their arms).

Mujahideen Material Losses: 40 Chinese Klashnikovs; 10 missiles; 5 light arms; 3 large quantities of various kinds of ammunition including Italian made arms, handgrenades and mines; 2 Mujahideen strongholds.

APPENDIX - 3

PROVINCEWISE INCIDENTS IN JUNE 1986 (MUJAHIDEEN SOURCES)

		Total Incidents	Provincial Capital	
Bordering Pakistan	Nimruz	xxxxx	Zaranj	xxxvv
	Hilmand	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	Lashkargarh	x
	Qandahar	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	Qandahar	xxxxxxxxxxx
		xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx		xxxvvvv
	Zabul	xxxxx	Qalat Gilzai	x
	Ghazni	xxxxxxxxxxxxxx	Ghazni	
	Paktika	xxxxxxx	Sharna	x
	Paktiya	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	Gardez	xxxxx
	Ningarhar	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	Jalalabad	xxx
		xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx		
Bordering Soviet Union	Kunar	xxxxxxx	Chagha Sarai	
	Badakhshan	xxxxxxx	Faizabad	
	Takhar	xx	Taloqan	x
	Kunduz	xxx	Kunduz	
	Baghlan	xxxxxx	Baghlan	
	Samangan	xx	Samangan	
	Balkh	xxxxxxxxxxx	Mazar-i-Sharif	
	Jozjan		Shebergan	
	Faryab	xxxxx	Maimana	
	Badghis		Qala Nau	
Bordering Iran	Herat	xxxxxxxxxxxxxx	Herat	xxxxxxxxxxx
		xxxxxxxxxxxxxx		xxxvv
Central Afghanistan	Farah (Nimruz)	x (xxxxx)	Farah (Zaranj)	xx
	Bamiyan		Bamiyan	
	Ghor		Changcharan	
	Uruzgan		Tarin Kot	
Kabul & Adj. Provinces	Kabul	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	Kabul	xxxxxxxxxxx
		xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx		xxxxxxxxxxx
		xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx		xxxxxxxxxxxv
		xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx		vvv
	Parwan	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	Charikar	
	Kapisa	xx	Mahmud-i-Raqi	
	Laghman	xxxxxxx	Mehtarlam	
	Logar	xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx	Pule Alam	xxv
		xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx		
	Wardak	xxxxxxx	Kotelesro	vvvv
TOTAL:		397 Engagements		

x = Inside city

v = Vicinity of city

APPENDIX - 4


MOBILE AND IMMOBILE TARGETS AND SOVIET-KABUL OPERATIONS IN JUNE 1986 (MUJAHIDEEN SOURCES)

		Mujahideen Mobile Targets	Mujahideen Immobile Targets	Soviet-Karmal Operations-Air & Ground
Bordering Pakistan	Nimruz		xxxxx	
	Hilmand	xxxxx	xxxxxxxxxx	xxx
	Qandahar	xxxxxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxxx
			xxxxxxxxxxx	xxx
	Zabul	xx	xx	x
	Ghazni	xxxx	xxxx	xxxxx
	Paktika	xxx	xx	xxx
	Paktiya	xxxxx	xxxxxxxxxxx	xx
	Ningarhar	xxxxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxxx
			xxxxxxxxxxx	xxxxxxx
Bordering Soviet Union	Kunar	x	xxxxxx	x
	Badakhshan	x	xxxxxxx	x
	Takhar		xx	
	Kunduz	x	xx	
	Baghlan	x	x	xxxx
	Samangan		xx	
	Balkh	xxxx	xxx	xxxx
	Jozjan			
	Faryab	x	x	xxx
	Badghis			
Bordering Iran	Herat	xxxxx	xxxxxxxxxxx	xxx
			xxxxxx	
Central Afghanistan	Farah (Nimruz)	x	(5)	
	Bamiyan			
	Ghor			
	Uruzgan			
Kabul & Adj. Provinces	Kabul	xxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxxx
		xxxxx	xxxxxxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxxx
			xx	
	Parwan	xx	xxxxxxxxxxx	xxx
	Kapisa	x	x	
	Laghman	xx	xx	xxxxx
	Logar	xxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxxx	xxxx
	Wardak	xxxxxxx	xxxxxxx	xxxxxxxxxxx
				xxxx
TOTAL:		87	194	116

APPENDIX — 5

PROVINCEWISE SOVIET—KABUL SECURITY OPERATIONS & RETURNEES IN JUNE 1986 (RADIO KABUL)

		<i>Soviet-Karmal Operations</i>	<i>Returnees</i>
Bordering Pakistan	Nimruz		
	Hilmand		
	Qandahar	xxx	
	Zabul		
	Ghazni		
	Paktika		
	Paktiya		
	Ningarhar		R (350)
	Kunar		
	Badakhshan		
Bordering Soviet Union	Takhar		
	Kunduz		
	Baghlan		
	Samangan		
	Balkh		R (95)
	Jozjan		RR (166)
	Faryab		
	Badghis	x	
	Herat		
	Farah	x	
Bordering Iran	(Nimruz)		
	Bamiyan		
Central Afghanistan	Ghor		
	Uruzgan		
Kabul & Adj. Provinces	Kabul	xxx	
	Parwan	x	R (20)
	Kapisa		
	Laghman		
	Logar		
	Wardak	xxx	
	TOTAL:	12 Security Operations	631 Returnees



Radio Kabul: Conflict reported in 6 provinces, namely, Qandahar, Badghis, Farah, Kabul, Parwan and Wardak. Besides, returnees reported in Ningarhar, Balkh, Jozjan and Parwan.

II.— THE POLITICO-ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN

1 — FOREIGN VISITS AND AGREEMENTS

Messages

Greeting messages to mark various occasions were sent to the Governments, Parties and Personnel of the following countries: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Mongolia, Mozambique and Malagasy.

Bulgaria

A protocol of cooperation was signed in Sofia between the State Committees for press and publication of the DRA and Bulgaria in the field of press and publication (*KNT*, 14 June).

France

The Charge d' Affairs of the French embassy in Kabul was handed over a protest note on 3rd June, alleging that France was active in anti DRA propaganda by different means (*KNT*, 4 June).

GDR

Abdul Ghafar Lakanwal, Minister of Agriculture and Land Reforms and President of Afghan-GDR Friendship Association heading a DRA delegation left Kabul on June 18, 1986 for Berlin to participate in the conference of Presidents of Friendship Associations of foreign countries with GDR (*KNT*, 19 June).

Hungary

Abdul Rashid Arian (head of the Party Control Committee of the PDPA and Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Council) heading a delegation left Kabul on June 29, 1986 for Hungary on a friendly visit, on the invitation of the CC of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (*KNT*, 30 June).

A literary cultural protocol was signed on June 27, for 1987-88 between the Writers' Unions of the DRA and the Hungary (*KNT*, 28 June).

India

A delegation from India, headed by S.K. Lamba, Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of India visited DRA in

the third week of June 1986, for talks with Afghan authorities on the results of implementation of the resolutions of the 7th session of Afghan India Commission.

During the stay in Kabul, the Indian delegation held talks with Afghan authorities on various aspects of cooperation in public health light industries and other fields. A memorandum of understanding was also signed by the two sides in Joint Commission (*KNT*, 23 & 28 June).

Libya

Najib held a meeting with Libyan envoy Salem Alajil Abdullah Alhani on June 2, 1986 (*KNT*, 3 June).

Poland

A delegation headed by Jerzy Jashkiernnia, Secretary General of the 'Patriots' movement for National Rebirth of Poland visited DRA in the 2nd week of June on the invitation of NFF to participate in the 5th founding anniversary of the NFF (*KNT*, 14 June).

Sulaiman Laeq, Minister of Nationalities and Tribal Affairs, heading a party delegation visited Poland in *late* June to participate in the work of the 10th Congress of the Polish United Workers Party (*PUWP*), (*KNT*, 28 June).

USSR

A protocol of cooperation between the Central Committee of the DYOA and Committee of the Youth Organization of Soviet Union was signed in Kabul on 1st June 1986 (*KNT*, 2 June).

An Afghan delegation of NFF headed by Abdul Rahim Hatif visited USSR at the invitation of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. On July 2nd the delegation held a meeting with Andrei Gromyko, President of the Presidium of the USSR. (Press Bulletin July 3, 1986 Press Information Department of USSR Embassy).

A technical and economic assistance contract for the Survey, Construction and Commissioning of Second Sorobi project was signed between DRA and USSR on 4 June 1986 (*KNT*, 5 June).

The Soviet Union and Afghanistan signed an agreement in Kabul on cooperation in Power Engineering. Under the agreement the Soviet Union will extend assistance to Afghanistan in building and running a factory that will maintain power engineering facilities in Kabul and supply with machines and materials for electric power station (Radio Moscow, 5 June).

An agreement of cooperation for 1986-90 and a work protocol for 1987-88 were signed between the Journalists Unions of the DRA and

Soviet Union on 19 June 1986 (*KNT*, 21 June).

A delegation of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee's International Relation Department arrived in Kabul on 23 June 1986 at the invitation of CC of PDPA. Najibullah, Karmal, Keshtmand and Shah Mohammad Dost reportedly held meetings with the Soviet delegation (Radio Kabul, 24 June).

Faqir Mohammad Yaqubi, President of the UNESCO National Commission of the DRA heading a delegation visited USSR in *late* June to participate in the 24th conference of the UNESCO National Commission of socialist countries (*KNT*, 28 June).

2 — POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Periodic Session of Politburo

A periodic Session of the Politburo of the PDP's CC was held in Kabul on 5 June 1986. It approved the report of Shah Mohammad Dost about the 7th round of Geneva talks. It also discussed various matters related internal and external situation (Radio Kabul, 5 June).

Appointments

Based on the proposal of the Council of Ministers and with the approval of RC Presidium of the DRA, Mohammad Aziz, Minister of Light Industries and Food Stuff was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and President of the State Planning Committee. Lemar Ahmed Lemar, President of State Controlling Committee was appointed as Minister of Light Industries and Food Stuff and Mohammad Sharif Sharif Vice-President of the Administrative Affairs of the Council of Ministers as President of State Controlling Committee (*KNT*, 23 June).

Constitution Commission Meets

The Commission drafting the basic constitution of the DRA met on 23 June 1986 under the chairmanship of the President of the RC Babrak Karmal. The meeting was attended by Najib and Sultan Ali Keshtmand. During the meeting the President of NFF, also the President of the Working Committee of the Commission, Abdul Rahim Hatif presented a report about the performance of the Committee. Later views and proposals about the constitution to be drafted were presented by the members of Commission (Radio Kabul, 23 June).

TU Plenum

The 15th Plenum of the Kabul City Council of Trade Unions was

convened on June 4, 1986 to consider mobilization of workers in the implementation of the five year socio-economic development plan for 1986-1991. At present over 126,000 people of Kabul are organised in trade union organizations (*KNT*, 5 June).

At present the total membership of TUA reportedly exceeds 270,000 organized in 2,448 primary and 828 departmental organizations. Of this figure 35.21% constitute workers, 4.33% peasants 7.69% craftsmen and 4.36% vocational teachers (*KNT*, 17 June).

The founding congress of the TUA held on March 16, 1981, with the participation of 500 delegates adopted its constitution and elected the members of its Central Council. TUA is a collective member of NFF.

NFF

The 5th founding anniversary of the NFF of the DRA was marked on June 18, 1986. Najib, Karmal, Keshtmand were present at the occasion among other top ranking officials. Abdul Rahim Hatif presented a detailed report on the activities of the NFF during the past five years (*KNT*, 19 June).

3239 councils of the NFF have been set up during its five years of existence. Beside collective members, the Front has also 112,209 individual members who are influential persons in the society. The Front plays an important role as part of the new political system and administration (*KNT*, 5 June).

Elections

Elections to local councils which began last year have by now been held in 15 of Afghanistan's 29 provinces. Reportedly in the continuing elections 25 deputies in Khost, 50 in Parwan, 44 in Paktia, 33 in Fariab were elected in the month of June 1986 (*KNT*, 2, 4, 12, 19, 25, 30 June).

Conscription Laws

A decree of the Presidium of RC of DRA was issued according to which two year's military service was compulsory for men aged 18 and over without exception, which included reportedly people previously exempted such as school boys, teachers, university professors and students (Monthly Bulletin, June No. 63 Afghan Information Centre Peshawar Pakistan and Radio Kabul 16 June).

The seminar held at Paktia province army corps and Gardez military division started on 20 June 1986, with the objective of further improving political activities in the army units. Suleman Laeq addressed (Radio Kabul, 21 June).

Najib visits on 12 June the Central Army Recruit Centre of Kabul City and the Infantry Training Regiment addressing the officers and soldiers (*KNT*, 14 June).

3 - ECONOMY

First Socio-Economic Plan

The implementation of first five year Socio-economic developmental plan after the April Revolution begun since the beginning of the current Afghan year March 21, 1986. According to plan, the land transport means of state sector will increase by 1.6 times. State goods 1560 vehicles of tonnage will also be imported and put into operation during the planned years 100 new buses will be imported for the passengers. During the planned years the volume of goods transportation will increase by 55.8% that is 2.6 million tons in which the state share will increase from 530,000 to 893,000 tons (*KNT*, 14 June).

Cooperatives in Capital

The third Plenum of Cooperatives Union of Kabul City was held. According to reports presented to the Plenum, the Cooperatives Union of Kabul City has set up Consumer Cooperatives in 11 districts of the city. A total of 25,000 persons have acquired the membership of these Cooperatives. The Union distributes through its regular and mobile stores consumer goods and food articles to the capital citizens (*KNT*, 01 June).

Exports

The export promotion department of Ministry of Commerce of the DRA exported commercial goods worth over 553 million dollars during last Afghan year (ended March 20, 1986). Showing an increase of 72 per cent compared with 1978 the first year of the April Revolution. The export items of the country are natural gas, chemical fertilizers, cotton wool, carpets rugs, karakul pelt, dry and fresh fruit, natural herbs, oil seeds intestine, fur and other kinds of Pelts. Considerable foreign exchange is earned by exports. Besides exporting by air, Hairatan, Shairkhan, Turghundi and Turkham are the land ports through which exports are made (*KNT*, 25 June).

Industry

286 private sector industries with a capital of 1650 million Afghanis are functioning in the DRA at present. It is planned to extend industrial estate of Kabul and provide for setting up another 46 indus-

trial institutions. Private entrepreneurs and investors have reportedly expressed their readiness to set up another new 96 projects after the 16th plenum and 10 point theses adopted by RC, of which 16 projects with a capital of 213.3 million Afghanis have been approved till now (*KNT*, 28 June).

Port Inaugurated

The third port of Istras Company in Hairatan was inaugurated. The port has been constructed on an area of 60,000 square metres at a total cost of \$ 10 million (*KNT*, 21 June).

Peasants

The Council of Ministers of the DRA on the basis of resolution No. 54 of May 27, 1986 has waived the commissions and penalties on their Agricultural Development Bank loans paid to the peasants land holders and agricultural cooperatives incurred up to the end of 1985. According to available data 1906.9 million Afghanis will be remitted by this measure (*KNT*, 17 June).

Land Reform

Over 1690 land ownership documents were distributed last year to peasant of Parwan Province. Water quota for 1,480 peasants families was fixed and fertilizers, improved seeds and pesticides were also distributed, (*KNT*, 01 June).

Construction

On the basis of available technical and financial sources and the assistance of the friendly countries, particularly Soviet Union construction activities in the DRA will be increased by 53% during 1986—1991. The implementation of the plan is estimated to cost 50,000 million Afghanis which will be financed by local sources (*KNT*, 04 June).

4 — YOUTH AND EDUCATION

Institute Inaugurated

The Social Science Institute Complex of the CC PDPA built with assistance of Soviet Communist Party, was inaugurated at a function on 24 June 1986 by Najibullah and Vice Chairman of the International Relations Section of the Soviet Communist Party Yori Mrcowich.

Speaking at the ceremony Najib stated that with the comprehensive Soviet assistance about hundred factories, irrigation system and

cultural centres have been established in DRA. The building of complex of the Social Science Institute is an important project built with the Soviet assistance (Radio Kabul, 24 June).

Literacy Courses

At present, over 20,000 literacy courses are attended by 400,000 people. It is claimed that 1.5 million men and women have graduated from the literacy courses. It is envisaged in the draft of the main aspects of socio-economic growth of the DRA that till the year 1991 the number of literacy courses will increase to 27250 and the number of graduates to 2.753 million throughout the country (*KNT*, 26 June).

Over 25,500 students, girls and boys are enrolled in the 44 Lycees, Secondary and Primary Schools of Baghlan Province. The teaching is done by 584 teachers. During the first 2 months of this year, six other primary schools were newly established in the province in which 357 students are enrolled (*KNT*, 17 June).

Kabul University

Over 200 students girls and boys, have been enrolled in the two departments of radio—television and press of the faculty of Journalism of the Kabul University which was established in the month of March (*KNT*, 12 June).

Tribal Students

Quoting a source of the Ministry of Education, the Bakhtar Information Agency report that during the current academic year a total number of 44,000 students are from the tribal areas to primary school. It is planned that 35 new schools will be set up in the border province of the country during the current year. At present one hundred and sixty six thousand children of the frontier tribes and nationalities are studying in three hundred and eighty four schools (Radio Kabul, 12 June).

Cinema: Ideological Weapon

The Afghan Film organization produces 4 full-length feature films, 14 documentaries and over 42 newsreels, according to plan each year. It is claimed that during the years of April Revolution film makers of the Afghan film have had significant achievements to turn the medium of one word cinematography into an ideological weapon against the counter-revolutionary bandits and all enemies of DRA (*KNT*, 23 June).

Fighting at University

On 3 June fighting reportedly broke out in the headquarters of the 40th party organizations of the university. The opponents were also Parchamis but divided into two rival groups: one composed of KHAD members (pro-Najib) and the other of activists of the ideology section (pro-Karmal). Six people were injured and some were killed (Afghan Information Centre, Monthly Bulletin No. 63, 6 June, Peshawar, Pakistan).

Art Exhibition

To welcome the 5th founding anniversary of NFF an Art exhibition was open by the Artist Union of the DRA (*KNT*, 18 June).

Conference Held

The first scientific and practical conference on ideological political and patriotic duties as well as the training of young students with high spirits of internationalism, was held by higher educational institutions on June 21, 1986, in Kabul. Noor Ahmed Noor delivered a speech. Participants of the conference discussed issues related to the organizational affairs, methods of ideological work (*KNT*, 22 June).

5 — NATIONALITIES POLICY

Nomads

Najib held a meeting on 31st May with various nomadic tribes from Ningarhar, Laghman and Kunar provinces. Najib assured the representatives of solving their problems and providing better living conditions to them in Afghanistan. The representatives of nomad's tribes expressed solidarity with DRA and Revolution (*KNT*, 1 June).

Tribal

According to Afghan Information Centre sources Afghan authorities have formed a council for "the people of Hazara Jat" on May 29. The President of Council is not known. Vice President is Dr. Abdul Wahid Sorabi, a Hazara and a West German educated Economist, former Minister of Planning under the king who turned collaborator with Karmal regime. The council is said to have 61 Hazara activists as members who are given the task of working on the population of Hazarajat (Central Afghanistan). Their job is either to win over Hazara resistance commanders to the side of the government, or in the case of internal conflicts, to support one Hazara group against the other (Afghan Information Centre, Monthly Bulletin, No. 63, June 1986

Peshawar, Pakistan).

Meetings

Najib met with the elders and representatives of different Kochi tribes Ningarhar, Laghman and Kunar provinces, Najib assured them support and cooperation. He also welcomed the "large number" of Kochis who have returned to Afghanistan from abroad (Radio Kabul, 31, May).

Najib held a meeting with the elders of Nooristani and Pashaie and assured them that practical step will be taken according to the programme of action of the PDPA to enable free people to take equal part in socio-economic affairs of the country (*KNT*, 3 June).

Jirgas

Jirgas were held in North Waziristan, Bajur Agency and Hazara to express support for the Afghan people and the government. The Jirgas also condemn the Pakistan government for its aggressive actions in Azad tribes.


Similarly the representatives of Khuga Khel, Mohmand, Jaji, Samkani, Mangal, Ahmed Khel Zadran, Ahmed Zai and 14 other tribes of Gardez Centre Paktia province held tribal Jirgas and declared support to DRA's people and government and denounced Pakistani government for its interference in tribal areas. The participants of the Jirga also supported the decisions of the Supreme Tribal Jirga about sealing their borders for the Afghan counter-revolutionaries (Radio Kabul, 31 May, 5 June, 11 June and *KNT*, 7 June).

Religion

The Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Religious Trust has reportedly distributed Afghanis 1,200,000 to the clergymen spiritual figures and preachers of mosques in the month of Ramadan (*KNT*, 5 June).

Returnees

According to reports received from Kabul people returned to their country during the last Afghan year which ended on March the 20th (Radio Moscow, 12 June).



III.— THE SOVIET CAMPAIGN OF 1985—A NET ASSESSMENT

David C. Isby*

1 — WHO CAME OUT AHEAD?

The end result of the 1985 campaign in Afghanistan has been described as a stalemate. While the year certainly failed to produce an immediately apparent decisive victory, what appear to be stalemates in guerrilla wars can be dynamic. In Vietnam, the Communists used the “stalemate” years of 1973-75 to prepare for the final offensive. In Malaya, the British used the “stalemate” years to prepare the institutions of government for independence and to slowly undercut the guerrillas. These were both examples of “dynamic stalemates”. Their importance was recognized only in retrospect. Guerrilla war, by definition, is not one that emphasizes newsworthy events, but rather the sum of small actions.

In this year of Dynamic Stalemate, the Soviets have demonstrated battlefield strength for another year. The border campaigns have not, on their face, proven more decisive than offensives in the interior in previous years. The Soviets proved they could go anywhere they wanted in Afghanistan, if they were willing to take the time and pay the price, although the Soviets do not seem to have abandoned the importance they have placed on minimizing casualties. While the Soviets emphasized them less than previous years, offensives in interior were still yield mounted, the Helmand Valley offensive of June-July being a successful example.

In 1985, guerrilla improvements — political and Military — proved significant but also not apparently decisive. The 1985 fighting showed that they were able to raise the cost for Communist operations. It strengthened their hold in many areas, especially in the eastern border country and the Panjsher. The guerrillas showed that they were able to operate even in de-populated areas, and food shortages, while frequently severe, were localized in effect. De-population continued, especially in areas affected by the border fighting and in Laghman and Logar. Both guerrillas and population are still relatively resistant

*David C. Isby is a New York based Lawyer specialising in International Affairs. He has worked for Simulations/Publications Inc., edited *Strategy and Tactics*, and designed Conflict-Simulation games. He is also author/editor of the book entitled *Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army*, published by *Jane's* in 1985.

to military and political Communist activity. This was reflected in the continued minimal legitimacy of the Kabul Regime, despite the calling of the *Loya Jirga* and the emphasis on the Fatherland Front. The emergence of the all-party coalition in Peshawar was paralleled by the greater degree of unity seen in Afghanistan. The border fighting included a greater degree of inter-group cooperation than before, with Jalulladin Haqani emerging as a strong leader. The *Hezb-i-Islami* interdiction of the Panjsher apparently halter, and a *modus vivendi* was reached between the parties in the Hazarajat.

2 — THE SITUATION AT THE END OF 1985

Secretary Gorbachev, surveying the war that may now become his, might be forgiven for thinking himself Back At The Place Where We Started. Yet 1985 includes some successes to balance out the loss of 2,500 soldiers and 200 aircraft. Time does give the Soviets advantages. Each year is an attrition process. No one beats Russia in a battle of attrition, especially not Afghanistan, one of the world's twenty poorest countries even in the piping days of peace. 1985 was another year without effective health care, education, or agricultural improvement in the Afghan countryside. 1985 was another year to get the world to accept that it can live with a Soviet-occupied Afghanistan; that it is, after all, a *fait accompli*. In 1985, if none of the Soviet goals appears to have been reached dramatically, they have also avoided dramatic failure. They have tried to continue building DRA institutions — government, army, party, KHAD — of which the last seems most effective. This has led to an effort to improve intelligence gathering. The 1985 fighting also demonstrated — not least to the government of Pakistan — the Soviet's ability to wage the war without outside sanctions or pressure. Linked with this, it is possible that more time will allow the internal political situation of the front-line states of Pakistan and Iran to evolve in a way that may be favourable to the Soviets.

In addition to more effective battlefield unity, the guerrillas also have better weapons, at least in the west. Yet the evolution from traditional warrior to modern guerrilla is not complete. The Panjsheri were capable of the most effective military action, again cutting the Salang Pass highway at times. The taking of Pechgour was probably one of the best guerrilla offensive operations of the war to date, but it seems unlikely to prove a milestone. While the guerrillas may have free range in much of Khandahar and Herat, they have not, since 1979, captured a provincial capitol, or a DRA brigade or division

headquarters. Despite the improved unity and weaponry of those attacking, neither Barikot nor Khost fell in 1985.

3 — CHANGES IN THE WAR IN 1985

1985 will doubtlessly be remembered as the year of the Soviet border campaigns. These included the two Kunar Valley offensives, both aiming at the relief of Barikot, three Paktia offensives, two of which involved Soviet troops which rarely operate in that province, and two offensives in the area between Herat and the Iranian border. The border campaign is certainly linked with the increased pressure put on Pakistan. These campaigns had interdiction of guerrilla movement and resupply as a primary mission, although this was shared, in the case of the two Kunar and Second Paktia offensive with relieving besieged outposts. The prodigious minelaying accompanied the destruction of villages and *chai khana*, wells, and agriculture, apparently intended to interdict guerrilla supply routes without having to maintain a Soviet presence on the ground in these areas or to create an air anti-infiltration campaign on the U.S. model. The mining was supplemented by increased interdiction efforts by special operations forces and *Hind* helicopters, especially in the southeast. The border campaigns may also have served to focus guerrilla attention and divert guerrilla resources away from the central areas, containing the paved roads, cities, and airfields that the Soviets hold to be vital.

The campaigns in the interior showed that the Soviets, while switching to a greater emphasis on border campaigns, have not abandoned large combined-arms offensives. The Helmand Valley was surprisingly intact after years of Soviet attacks on agriculture, another example of the inconsistencies that appear in Soviet operations and tactics in the war. While information remains relatively scarce, it appears that the Soviets took their order from U.S. General Phillip Sheridan's offensive in another valley — the Shenandoah — in 1964: "I want it that a crow flying over this valley will have to carry his own rations". It is likely the guerrillas in the Helmand, without combat experience, were unable to stand up to a Soviet combined arms offensive similar to that seen in Paktia or the Kunar Valley. The Soviets have continued de-populating areas and routing out local guerrillas, despite the fact that guerrillas have been operating in largely depopulated areas, such as the Jagdalak, Gandamak, and Koh-i-Safi areas, all within striking range of Kabul. De-population and destruction of agriculture was also seen in the Logar and Laghman offensives, which appeared to be even more destructive to the civil population

than those in the past. With the increase in the Kabul defenses, it may be more difficult to bring out food for guerrillas in depopulated areas from Kabul bazaar than in the past. Another significant campaign in the interior, Panjsher IX, differed from those of previous years. It was not intended to clear out the valley or as a response to Panjsheri attacks on the Salang Pass highway, especially at the stretch known to the guerrillas as "The Suez Canal". Rather, it was intended as a quick response to the fall of Pechgour, and it left Massoud's control of the floor of the main valley improved.

In 1985, the Soviets both demonstrated tactical improvements and increased the tempo of operations. In the words of Massoud Khalili, head of the press office of *Jamiat Islami*, "a few years ago, Soviet Army units spent perhaps 25% of their time fighting. In 1985, they started to spend 90% of their time fighting". This increased tempo of operations is not the same as tactical tempo — the Army that aims to reach the Rhine in ten days made a painfully slow advance from Asmar to Barikot — but is reflected in reports from their guerrillas and journalists. In 1985, more happened inside Afghanistan. Soviet tactical improvements include the increased use of special operations forces and tactics. These tactics can be carried out by a minority but significant percentage of the Limited Contingent. The use of long-range artillery weapons as well as fixed-wing aircraft in the "firepower war" to destroy villages and infrastructure has been expanded. 1985 saw the use of weapons such as FROG-7s, 240mm mortars, 220mm multiple rocket launchers, and 152mm SP howitzers (some of my friends captured one of these in Paktia). Despite a greater SA-7 threat, Soviet helicopters apparently became more effective. No longer are "targets of opportunity" resolutely refused, a change which may have contributed to the death of Charles Thornton. Helicopters have also operated at night without flares. Fixed-wing tactics have also become more effective. More *Frogfoots* appeared, ranging as far east as Paktia.

While the DRA Armed Forces showed no marked improvement, they also suffered no large-scale collapse, even with the increased participation in the border campaigns and stronger guerrillas. The border country remains mainly a DRA responsibility and the DRA lost no major defensive positions and suffered less major defections than in many previous years. The garrisons of Barikot and Khost held out. The garrison of Pechgour did not, but reportedly fought before being overrun. The DRA regulars did not prove much more effective on the attack than they had in previous years — as the defeats of the 444th Commando Brigade in Panjsher IX and elements of the 9th and 11th Divisions in the first Kunar Valley offensive

showed. Two substantial defections, the sabotage of the MiGs at Shindand, and the events in the Panjsher and around Herat showed that the DRA military is still subject to join with the guerrillas under pressure. The 25th Division, which withstood the siege of Khost and was then able to go over to the offensive by itself after the Soviets failed to relieve it, certainly was "division of the year" for the DRA. The 17th Division, which has again failed to exercise control over Herat city, was probably the worst. Militia and non-Army armed forces increased in numbers and were effective in some places, but there is no evidence of a large-scale change.

The guerrillas in much of Afghanistan have changed greatly from those in 1979-80, largely due to combat experience. One reason that the Helmand Valley offensive was so devastating is that the Afghans there lacked experience. The Afghans certainly have had greater firepower in 1985 than ever before, especially in the east. The arrival of 107mm rockets, as used to make attacks on targets in the Kabul area, gave the guerrillas effective long-range weapons for the first time. The disruption of the PDPA anniversary celebrations in January may have been one of the motivations in the expansion of the Kabul defenses into a triple ring of outposts.

Guerrillas have been trained to use these weapons, although their effectiveness remains widely variable. The guerrillas who took Pechgour appear to have been well trained and effective. The increased level of weapons and training are what enabled the guerrillas in the Kunar Valley and Paktia offensives of 1985 to fight so strongly. Press reports stated that the guerrillas stood and fought, rather than operating in traditional Afghan hit-and-run fashion. Casualties were heavy on both sides. Rahmatullah Safi, commanding guerrillas throughout the major Paktia offensive, had never seen such intensive fighting, with barrages of multiple rocket launches on both sides, and incessant Soviet airstrikes. Safi, however, was one Afghan who had his doubts about these type of tactics. He believed that standing up to fight the Soviets in a "conventional" manner means giving up the guerrilla's advantages and makes them more vulnerable to Soviet firepower. History suggests Safi may have a point. In Vietnam (at the time of Tet), in Cuba and in Greece, Communist guerrillas who stood and fought in prolonged battles suffered heavy losses and had to revert to a more "classic" guerrilla pattern, although in Greece they were effectively "mopped up". While the current coalition in Peshawar seems to be stronger than any of its predecessors, it still has not apparently spawned a military command similar to that of SWAPO or the PLO. Even if it did, the absence of a command, control, and communication system would

hinder implementing its decisions. Cooperation and unified battlefield action has become more common — as the border fighting showed. Yet even the best regional commanders, aside from Massoud, have difficulties organizing regionwide combined action. Massoud Khalili found this out on a mission to Ismael Khan, near Herat, in 1985. The defection of Ismatullah Achakzai created local problems for guerrillas in the southeast, as he was able to interdict major supply routes and was aware of many guerrilla locations. Yet while the practice of unofficial local truces remains, few guerrillas seem prone to follow Ismatullah. Another individual that Communist statements suggest they would like to see as a model for Afghanistan as a whole is Abdul Zamir Zarifiah, the Governor of Balkh Province and a "Red Mullah" in the tradition of Soviet Central Asia. The use of Islam as a tool of Communist rule still proved of minimal effectiveness in 1985.

4 — 1985'S IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The full impact of the Soviet campaign of 1985 is not yet readily apparent. The Soviets used improved tactics and new weapons in the border battles. These had a considerable interdiction effect while they were in progress. The subsequent minelaying and scorched earth actions will certainly hinder guerrilla movement, as will increased *Hind* and special operations. Yet this still does not amount to a systematic interdiction campaign. 1985's border fighting does not mean that the Soviets have changed their apparent earlier policy that the border areas are indeed peripheral to their strategic objectives. The increased border operations probably took place because Barikot and Khost were in danger of falling as the DRA forces were increasingly out-gunned by better armed and more skilful guerrillas (as shown in the first Kunar Valley offensive) and to exert more pressure on Pakistan (this is certainly what was felt in Islamabad in February, 1985).

The campaign in the interior is carried on in the same way it has since mid-1980, emphasizing de-population and destruction of agriculture. In 1985, these have been applied with great savagery but less consistency. Soviet fighter-bombers still bomb fields and villages but do not hit the *markaz* of many guerrilla leaders. That there are still guerrillas in the thrice-raided Paghman area demonstrates the limitations of this operational approach. But the Soviets are certainly having a cumulative effect on Afghanistan. If the crops were to fail now as they did in the early 1970s, much of Afghanistan would be facing an Ethiopia-style famine. Attrition has taken its toll

not only of fields, granaries, and *karaz*, but of people's health and resistance, of the available vehicles and pack animals needed to carry grain. The increased defenses around Kabul may cut down on food smuggled out, inhibiting guerrilla operations in the surrounding depopulated areas.

The DRA has not increased cohesion, legitimacy or effectiveness in 1985. Babrak Karmal is still not Fidel Castro. No radically new policies were emphasized, but some of the older ones yielded limited successes. The army, militia, and KHAD did not collapse in the face of increased pressure, showing they cannot be factored out of future events and may improve. De-tribalized rural Pathans still fight like the devil, whether in the ranks of *Hezb-i-Islami* or the 25th Division.

In 1985 the guerrilla's greater political unity in Peshawar and in Afghanistan still has not evolved into more concrete organization. The trends existing in the last few years have been accented in 1985, but there have been no radical changes in the direction of unity or modernity, although inter-group violence seems to have decreased. Reports from Herat, however, suggest that regional organization is still difficult even in the west, although the combination of flat and urban terrain in the area of operations contributes greatly to this. While the Panjsher remained undefeated in 1985, its capabilities and reach expanding, it remains that neither Massoud's organization or the military capability demonstrated at Pechgour have been widely exported. If there are more Massouds, more areas like the Panjsher, there will be more Pechgours. In 1986, the guerrillas will face a number of basic strategic decisions. They could revive the "traditionalist" strategy of 1983, to seize a town in the east that could be declared the seat of a free Afghan government. They could also try and adopt a more "conventional" fighting approach, trying to engage DRA units in open battle, possibly in conjunction with attacks on fortified positions to draw a response. Both of these approaches would focus the war again in peripheral areas, would shift the Afghans away from guerrilla tactics and would require a degree of concentration that could make them vulnerable to Soviet airpower and artillery. Another alternative would be to try and funnel resources into the interior and to the west, trying to create more effective guerrillas and support capable regional commanders, leading to forces capable of sustained guerrilla action against roads, cities, and airfields. Pakistani action will certainly influence whatever decisions are made. The political dimension will certainly influence the war in 1986. It is uncertain whether the new Pakistani government will move in a different direction, but it is unlikely to have the capability of the previous govern-

ment for support of the Afghans.

In the end, the winner may be not the side that scores the most newsworthy victories, but whomever wins the "dynamic stalemate". If the trends of 1985 continue, the Soviets are unlikely to achieve a quick (within five years) victory in the absence of extensive political changes in Pakistan or widespread food shortage in Afghanistan. The "bad neighbours" policy — reportedly articulated as such in a speech by Karmal — suggests that the new emphasis on mining and interdiction, and, indeed the whole border strategy is linked with pressure on Pakistan. This "regional" approach, linking military action with political pressure on the front-line states, is a possible pattern for the future.

In 1985, the guerrillas have shown an increased ability to raise costs to the Soviets on the battlefield. This may make it impossible for the Soviets to control the Panjsher or may make relieving Khost more costly than it is worth, but it is hard to apply these successes to a generalization that they are being successful throughout the country as a whole. There has been an undoubted rise in guerrilla battlefield capability. Unfortunately, for a number of reasons, not all of which are the fault of the guerrillas and their leaders, this has not necessarily been accompanied by a rise in geopolitical capability, in their international visibility, and by the willingness of friendly nations to raise the cost to the Soviets above that inflicted on the battlefield. Both sides are suffering from a long war. It is unlikely whether there would be draft riots in Georgia and Armenia or whether the Soviets would be giving the war a high-visibility approach if they were not feeling some pressure. Yet in 1986 it will be the guerrillas who will again, despite their battlefield success, again face the dangers of attrition and exhaustion.

MINES

The 1985 campaign has been marked by the increased use of mines by the Soviets. These mines were used in both offensive and defensive roles — offensively to limit guerrilla movement and to interdict supply lines, defensively around Communist positions.

The use of mines for interdiction dates from the start of the war. The mine most frequently used was the PFM-1, the infamous “butterfly”, dropped from helicopters. As early as 1983, Soviet special operations forces mined stream fords on the route to the Panjsher. Defensive minefields have also been significant throughout the war. The DRA garrison at Urgan survived the siege of 1983-84 in large part because of the dense minefields around them.

Mines in use in 1985 include:

PFM-1: airdropped from helicopters, frequently used in conjunction with Soviet heliborne operations. Before moving through a village, the Soviets will sow escape routes with these mines. Comes in green or brown colors. Limit off-track night movement in many areas and have taken a tremendous toll of animals in the border area.

“Toy Bombs”: This journalist’s favorite has never surfaced in the flesh, not have fragments. Its design is such that it would not leave fragments and it reportedly has a short life before self-destructing. Victims of these weapons have spoken to Western journalist. Reports are so widespread, especially from the early war period, that there has been doubtlessly some use. Significantly, the Germans reported the Soviet use of similar weapons in the Second World War.

BM-27 Minelet Rounds: In 1984, the Soviets started to use 220mm BM-27 multiple rocket launchers to lay minefields, part of the increased use of high technology and long range firepower that has marked operations in recent years. The mines have been described as PFM-1s or “as like gray slices of cheese”.

Fixed Wing Aircraft Minelets: In 1984, the Afghans reported that Soviet fighter-bombers were dropping cannisters that dispensed minelets. The description seemed to fit the “gray slices of cheese” variety.

PMN: This standard Soviet anti-personnel mine was apparently what was put down in the largest number in the border area in 1985. It also is used as part of the defences of many Communist

outposts. Because they are light and can be surface-planted, they can be used to seal gaps in minefields when under attack. Surface-planted PMNs surrounded the garrison at Urgan in December, 1983, covered by machineguns. The guerrillas did not feel capable of lifting them.

Claymore-type mines: In limited use for perimeter defence missions. They are reported in use around Jalallabad airfield.


The Soviets plant almost exclusively anti-personnel mines, probably because of the danger that the Afghans will recover them and use them on roads. The guerrillas generally prefer to use antitank mines to the exclusion of anti-personnel mines, because the anti-personnel mines are almost as difficult to transport and cannot destroy tanks. Guerrilla mine-clearing capability is limited, outside of the Panjsher. There are few guerrillas able to defuse mines or even remove them safely and the ritual of mine-clearing so familiar to Western engineers, with tapes, and cleared lanes and a great emphasis on overwatch and safety, is quite alien to the guerrillas. In the Panjsher, and possibly elsewhere, pre-1942 mineclearing technology is used, involving probing and dragging weighted grapples across minefields to detonate them. Electronic mine detectors are in scarce supply.

Appendix — B

HOW TO RAISE THE COST

The 1985 fighting has given some indication of the changes in the war. If the United States is to maintain effective aid to the guerrillas in the light of changing conditions in Afghanistan. While it is by no means certain that the Soviet would make their decision on their future Afghanistan policy on a cost-benefit ratio, it remains that they are probably going to be more likely to alter their policies if the cost is higher. A variety of U.S. policies can help raise the cost:

1. *Support For the Peshawar Coalition.* The coalition needs support in building its internal institutions to make it a body at least on the level of the PLO or SWAPO. Similarly, the U.S. should press for its representation in international forums similar to those bodies. Friendly Islamic nations should hopefully do the same in the Islamic Conference. This will increase legitimacy and decrease inter-group jealousy.
2. *Increased Humanitarian Aid.* 1985 has seen an increased U.S. humanitarian aid effort, but the Afghan people need help in evolving alternative government services — communications, medicine, agricultural, educational — and aid here can prevent the effects of attrition striking home. Food, clothing, blankets, and medicines must aid may be undercut. If there were more humanitarian aid, there would be less Kalashnikovs being sold in Parachinar bazaar. Making an increased supply of motor vehicles and pack animals available would also help. The “refugee prevention” aspects of such aid could be supported by the Pakistanis.
3. *Training For Guerrillas.* The guerrillas still require effective training. This includes advisory work. It should also include leadership type schools for those in command positions. Massoud is one Afghan who has put even brief instruction to good use. Afghan guerrilla commanders are hungry for military knowledge. In addition to commanders and units, specialists such as rocket gunners, paramedics, or radiomen also require specialized training.
4. *Help Prepare Training Literature.* Training literature and aids pitched at the level of the average Afghan guerrilla need to be prepared and widely distributed. This includes things such as posters and comic book type manuals dealing with basic skills.
5. *Provide Material the Afghans Cannot Generate.* The guerrillas need access to things such as up-to-date intelligence, maps, “lessons learned” publications.
6. *Increase Availability of Non-Lethal Equipment.* Mine detectors and radios are two important categories.
7. *Support For Pakistan.* Much of this will only be possible with the continued support of the Pakistani government. If the government of Pakistan can increase actions possible on behalf of the guerrillas, then they must be sustained against possibly increased Soviet pressure.
8. *Increased Informational Effort.* In cooperation with friendly governments, the United States could try and bring home the reality of the Afghanistan War to Islamic nations and to the people of the Soviet Union.
9. *Continued Awareness of Afghanistan in Bi-Lateral Negotiations.* The United States must stress to the Soviets that it will not be “business as usual” as so long as the war continues. This applies to a wide variety of contacts.



STRATEGIC STUDIES

(Quarterly Journal)

Published by

The Institute of Strategic Studies
8, Khayaban-e-Iqbal, F-6/3
(P.O. Box 1173) Islamabad, Pakistan

Contains Stratagems, Strategic Map Review,
Research Articles on Strategy and Allied
Disciplines and Book Reviews

Subscription rates:—

<i>Annual</i>	:	Pakistan	Rs. 50/-	
		Overseas	\$ 10/-	(including surface postage)
<i>Single Copy</i>	:	Pakistan	Rs. 15/-	
		Overseas	\$ 3/-	(including surface postage)

Available in all major bookshops in Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Lahore, Peshawar, Quetta, Karachi, and Sialkot. Also reaching out to over 150 centres of learning abroad.